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The Representation of Language

  • Matthias Haase
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Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic
This chapter is in the book Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic

Abstract

The contemporary debate on the metaphysics of language is dominated by two positions. According to the one, languages are not things in the world; they are abstract objects. According to the other, a language consists in the historical chain of causally interrelated acts and states of its speakers. The later Wittgenstein would reject both positions. A natural language is neither an abstract object nor a singular happening of any kind; it is something general that is actual or concrete. The difficulty to understand the peculiar kind of actuality of a language is, I argue, the source of the rule-following puzzle. Its solution consists in an investigation of the logical grammar of the statements with which speakers of a language describe their use of words.When we say what ‘we’ or ‘one’ says, the pronouns exhibit a kind genericity that cannot be treated within the quantificational model of generality.

Abstract

The contemporary debate on the metaphysics of language is dominated by two positions. According to the one, languages are not things in the world; they are abstract objects. According to the other, a language consists in the historical chain of causally interrelated acts and states of its speakers. The later Wittgenstein would reject both positions. A natural language is neither an abstract object nor a singular happening of any kind; it is something general that is actual or concrete. The difficulty to understand the peculiar kind of actuality of a language is, I argue, the source of the rule-following puzzle. Its solution consists in an investigation of the logical grammar of the statements with which speakers of a language describe their use of words.When we say what ‘we’ or ‘one’ says, the pronouns exhibit a kind genericity that cannot be treated within the quantificational model of generality.

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