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Our Life with Truth

  • Jocelyn Benoist
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Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic
This chapter is in the book Language, Form(s) of Life, and Logic

Abstract

This article opposes the idea that it is possible to extract a theory of forms of life from Wittgenstein’s Investigations. It puts forward instead the elucidatory - not explanatory - nature of the concept of ‘forms of life’ in Wittgenstein’s work. To this end we first return to the original context in which Wittgenstein introduced this expression: the discussion of Russell’s Limits of Empiricism to be found in Ursache und Wirkung. The analysis of this text allows to reassess what the primacy of ‘deed’ means in Wittgenstein’s analysis. Wittgenstein’s ‘primitivism’ is discussed and it is shown that we should absolutely distinguish between deflationism - which Wittgenstein endorses as a method - and reductionism - which he rejects. ‘Forms of life’ are at the same time a tool for such deflation and such anti-reduction. Wittgenstein’s purpose is not to found truth and other normative accomplishments in a life without truth, but to disclose normativity at work in very basic performances of our lives. On this basis, in a second step, we return to the famous passages of the Philosophical Investigations that make use of the notion ‘forms of life’ and show how these remarks should not be understood along the lines of any ‘relativism’, but as a pedagogical attempt at making us aware of the open variety in the ways of truth. In this pedagogy, ‘forms of life’ have an essentially methodological function.

Abstract

This article opposes the idea that it is possible to extract a theory of forms of life from Wittgenstein’s Investigations. It puts forward instead the elucidatory - not explanatory - nature of the concept of ‘forms of life’ in Wittgenstein’s work. To this end we first return to the original context in which Wittgenstein introduced this expression: the discussion of Russell’s Limits of Empiricism to be found in Ursache und Wirkung. The analysis of this text allows to reassess what the primacy of ‘deed’ means in Wittgenstein’s analysis. Wittgenstein’s ‘primitivism’ is discussed and it is shown that we should absolutely distinguish between deflationism - which Wittgenstein endorses as a method - and reductionism - which he rejects. ‘Forms of life’ are at the same time a tool for such deflation and such anti-reduction. Wittgenstein’s purpose is not to found truth and other normative accomplishments in a life without truth, but to disclose normativity at work in very basic performances of our lives. On this basis, in a second step, we return to the famous passages of the Philosophical Investigations that make use of the notion ‘forms of life’ and show how these remarks should not be understood along the lines of any ‘relativism’, but as a pedagogical attempt at making us aware of the open variety in the ways of truth. In this pedagogy, ‘forms of life’ have an essentially methodological function.

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