When a Door Closes, a Window Opens? Long-Term Labor Market Effects of Involuntary Separations
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Simone Balestra
and Uschi Backes-Gellner
Abstract
This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30% and, although it quickly shrinks, it remains at around 15% in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident that the self-reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.
© 2019 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- When a Door Closes, a Window Opens? Long-Term Labor Market Effects of Involuntary Separations
- Candidates’ Education and Turnout: Evidence from Italyn Municipal Elections
- von Thünen: Capital, Production Functions, Marginal Productivity Wages, and the Natural Wage
- On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
- On Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy
- Reply to Gebhard Kirchgässner