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This paper attempts to offer a positive reading of Tractarian ethics motivated by Kevin Cahill’s therapeutic framing of the Tractatus , on which ethics and language are taken to be coextensive, mutually encompassing spheres. This is taken to secure positive import for Tractarian ethics in a broad sense, though not connected to specific approbations or prohibitions. This is argued for in three sections: first, specifying the animating therapeutic intention of the Tractatus as reawakening the reader to a sense of wonder, against the sedative effects of scientific-causal explanations; second, an elucidation of the underlying logic of TLP 6.4 – 42 to show that Wittgenstein’s repudiation of ethical propositions is not an abolition of ethics but an assertion of the disparity between the absolute value of ethics and the aims of scientific explanation; and third, outlining a positive reading of Tractarian ethics beginning with the cryptic expression, “ethics is transcendental”, by drawing out an analogy with logic as the transcendental condition of language to a view of ethics as a condition of meaningful actions and lives.

While this is not the first attempt at drawing a parallel between the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the writings and musical experimentations of John Cage pertaining to silence, we try to further develop this fortunate example of synchronous investigations into the subject matter by pointing out the analogous transformations in their thought, leading from a silence that can be qualified as “mystical” or “spiritual” to an experience that confronts the listener with the very real contingency of their grammar itself, all the while basing ourselves on previous arguments and contributions. In the context of western classical music, we will show that by circumventing a conventional use of musical silence in which it is treated as an ordinary language-game, the authors discover an extramusical experience of silence that they will first explore by the means of spirituality before making the remarkable turn towards an understanding of silence as that which founds our every experience, be it at the cost of silence itself.

Meaning, Interpreting, Understanding In his Kritik der verstehenden Vernunft (2018), Vittorio Hösle attempts to develop a comprehensive foundation for the so-called Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). The basis for this foundational work is a conception of understanding that ties all understanding to the interpretative grasp of what we and others mean by the use of certain symbols or linguistic expressions. The present essay argues that this makes Hösle’s approach vulnerable to a particular form of skepticism, as it is expounded by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). The first part of the essay outlines this skeptical challenge and its implications for Hösle’s conception of understanding. The second part advances the argument that this conception's vulnerability to skepticism undermines its viability as a foundation for the humanities. Instead, it invites the kind of skepticism described in Kripke’s challenge, where understanding itself seems to be impossible. The essay concludes with some tentative suggestions for an alternative conception of understanding that not only avoids this skepticism altogether but also makes room for a way of thinking about the mental that is of independent interest.

In what follows I will try to show that hinge propositions do not constitute the ultimate ground upon which we stand fast, but rather voice a metaphysical temptation, the temptation to offer an ultimate and undoubtable foundation of which we can be absolutely certain. After a brief sketch of what hinge propositions are, I propose that we read them as exclamations pointing to nonsense, a limit to intelligibility. Interpreted thus, hinge propositions, either ascertained or doubted, show what nonsense in On Certainty might be, namely, the confusion that either their certitude or doubt produce. I will try to substantiate my interpretation showing that Wittgenstein in On Certainty was well aware of the temptation to proclaim hinge propositions as absolute certainties – a temptation he rejects. I will try to establish the above claim by offering a critique of Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretation that we read hinges as merely showing and not as something that we can explicitly acknowledge, say or articulate.

Philosophy of language in the 21 st century has cultivated a concern for the hateful, the coercive, and the lethal. Amidst this shift of attention toward politically significant speech, ‘non-ideal’ philosophers of language investigate whether common conceptual toolkits from ‘mainstream’ philosophy of language manage to make contact with our non-ideal world in the first place. Drawing on a tradition of Wittgensteinian critical social thought, I contend that philosophers of language risk their (ideology‐)critical bite when they isolate our words from the activities into which they are woven. That is, when philosophers fail to register our ordinary investment in the words we put on display—the interests, stakes, and concerns in light of which we voice them—we make their political import unavailable to philosophy of language. But the non-ideal philosopher’s concept of idealization is itself a normatively non-neutral tool; and, as such, it exemplifies the sort of theoretical resource that may be mobilized with an investment in shaping not only our epistemic resources but also our senses of what matters.

I address some issues on the concept woman that might illuminate both feminist thought and practice, and the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Using Sonia Sedivy’s New Wittgensteinian approach to accuse Neo-Wittgensteinians and their critics of still being essentialists about the concept art , I point out that Cressida Heyes’ Wittgensteinian anti-anti-essentialism concerning the concept woman is subject to the same accusation. Heyes suggests that, in the Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein provides feminist philosophers with a kind of anti-anti-essentialism based on which a dilemma concerning the concept woman can be dismissed. She grounds her anti-anti-essentialism in her reading of Philosophical Investigations as offering feminist philosophers the idea that we can draw the boundaries of the concept woman according to our moral and political purposes. My goal is to call this grounding into question considering the New Wittgensteinian reading, such as Sedivy’s. I suggest that Heyes’ proposal falls prey of the essentialist illusion it tries to escape. I end by enquiring whether this same criticism can be applied to current ameliorative projects concerning the concept woman within so-called conceptual ethics or engineering.

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Constantine Sandis have suggested that our sense of being ‘women’ (and ‘men’) can be elucidated by thinking of it as an animal certainty. The suggestion is helpful in resisting the notion that ‘being woman’ can be modelled either on the idea of indubitable first-person knowledge of one’s inner self or of a third person’s unquestionable knowledge of one’s body. One’s being woman is manifested in one’s ways of acting and reacting; it constitutes a mode of being, which cannot be given further justification. Nevertheless, I argue that the emphasis on certainty may render the possible doubts an individual may entertain about being a woman at different stages and in different contexts of their life opaque. It may also obscure the philosophical analysis of what thinking of certainty with Wittgenstein may offer to the understanding of ‘woman’, since for him the exploration of meaningful and impossible forms of doubt always ran parallel to his thinking on certainty. Considering everyday examples of certainty and doubts in being a woman, I therefore discuss the dialectic between certainty and doubt in the constitution of being ‘a woman’, giving special attention to the significance of second person assertions and comments for the first person’s experience of being or not being a woman or not being ‘woman enough’.

What is conceptual injustice, and how can it supplement hermeneutical injustice? By bringing feminist epistemology, in particular Miranda Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice, into dialogue with conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, this article sheds light on what conceptual injustice is and how it can supplement hermeneutical injustice. What needs to be understood is how concepts can be advantageous to some and disadvantageous to others. For this, I propose approaching language in its relationship with ethics: something I call the ethics of attention to language. By combining a Wittgenstein-Murdochian approach to concepts with the ethics of attention, I try to demonstrate how an ethics of attention to language can counter cognitive disabilities or forms of cognitive blockages constituting experiences of oppression and how it can be an antidote to conceptual injustice. I argue that this ethics of attention to language can be especially beneficial to feminism.

This paper is concerned with Stanley Cavell’s reading of the notion of privacy as it appears in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private language argument (PLA). Defined as a fantasy or fear either of inexpressiveness or excessive expressiveness (cf. Cavell 1979: 254), I argue that such an account is partial, in that it does not represent those individuals that are exposed to epistemic injustice. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s seminal work Epistemic Injustice (2007) and on Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), I trace some similarities between the conditions of marginalized subjectivities and the private language speaker. This comparison suggests a correction of Cavell’s words and discloses an understanding of the clarificatory import that Wittgenstein’s PLA conveys, rendering it a way to resist marginalization and alienation due to the logical impossibility of a private language. In the second part of the paper (section 3), I consider two other Cavellian notions, namely the “claim to community” and ‘the turn to the ordinary’. Following the line of criticism developed in section 2, which revolves around the need of considering the situatedness of marginalized subjectivities and the oppressive character of the dimension of the ordinary, I try to implement Cavell’s concepts. I do so by taking into account (i) the Wittgenstein-inspired wider conception of rationality Alice Crary (2015) purports and (ii) the practices of some feminist consciousness-raising groups that were active in Milan (Italy) during the Seventies and some ideas developed by feminist and art critic Carla Lonzi. These contributions show that it is possible to maintain the general asset purported by Cavell, but they also call for criteria for better defining on which principles a community can form and which role the collectivity plays in revising the structure of the ordinary.