Band 4, Heft 1 - Negligence in the Law (Part II)

The tort law of negligence is one of our principal forms of protection against accidental physical injury. But it is underspecified in one respect and incomplete in another. The common law of negligence is underspecified in that its norm of reasonable care does not register clearly enough the fact that it is reasonable to take greater precautions against some kinds of physical injuries — severe and irreparable ones — than it is against other kinds — mild and fully repairable ones. The common law of negligence is incomplete in that it relies on the award of money damages to induce prospective injurers to exercise reasonable care prospectively, yet does not so much as attempt to fully monetize the harm done by unreasonable risks that result in death.

Negligence law is built around the paradigmatic case of a person who unreasonably preferred his own interests to those of others and, as a result, caused damage to another person. However, this case is not representative of all instances of negligence. In some cases, the negligent injurer failed in balancing between the interests of the victim alone; in other cases, he failed in balancing between the victim’s interests and those of a third party; sometimes the injurer failed in balancing the victim’s interests and the interests of the public or of society as a whole; and in yet other instances, he failed in balancing between his own interests. This article argues that the law should not treat in the same manner the different types of instances of failure in balancing between interests. Both justice and deterrence considerations mandate different treatment for the different types of instances, in accordance with the type of interests that the negligent injurer failed to balance. The article focuses on the typical types of balances of interests that the potential injurer is required to conduct before taking action, with the aim of determining the degree to which it is crucial to impose tort liability in each type of case. The article also examines whether prevailing negligence law is compatible with the thesis developed in the article and proposes tools for achieving such compatibility.

The legal literature generally assumes that an aggregate-risk-utility test is employed to determine whether conduct was reasonable or negligent. However, this test is infrequently mentioned by the courts and almost never explains their decisions. Instead, they apply, explicitly or implicitly, various justice-based standards that take into account the rights and relationships among the parties. This is true even for the two judges most closely identified with the aggregate-risk-utility test: Learned Hand and Richard Posner. During the five decades (1909-1961) that Hand served as a federal judge, he mentioned the test in only eleven opinions, between 1938 and 1949, and in none of those opinions did he actually apply the test to resolve the negligence issue. In his last reference to the test, in 1949, he essentially abandoned it. None of his fellow circuit judges ever mentioned the test. Posner claims that the Hand formula expresses an economic efficiency interpretation of negligence that has long been implicit in judicial opinions. However, Posner’s arguments are based on speculative and implausible assumptions, overbroad generalizations, selective quotations, and superficial descriptions of cases that misstate or ignore facts, language, rationales, and holdings that are inconsistent with his argument. The same flaws are apparent in Posner’s attempts to apply the Hand formula in his own judicial opinions. Neither he nor his like-minded colleague, Frank Easterbrook, has been able to employ the Hand formula to resolve the negligence issue in any case, and none of their fellow circuit judges has attempted to do so.

The two leading theoretical approaches to tort law — economic analysis and corrective justice — are blind to distributive considerations. Moreover, even the main distributive approaches to tort law — loss-spreading and fairness — fail to emphasize egalitarianism as a distributive consideration. This article argues that egalitarianism should influence the normative evaluation of one’s conduct as negligent or not. It first explains why normatively negligence law should be sensitive to the egalitarian concern, suggesting three different accounts for this claim, based on needs, equality, and desert as criteria for distribution. Second, it argues that egalitarianism is commensurate with the basic understanding of negligence law as reflecting corrective justice and notions of fault. The notion of fault is, therefore, reformulated from within, in order to accommodate egalitarianism. Third, I maintain that in order for egalitarianism to accommodate notions of corrective justice, egalitarian concerns should matter also at the stage of the standard of care. While the egalitarian concern can and should be integrated into the duty stage, I argue that such integration is insufficient. A correct and full understanding of the egalitarian concern and the tort of negligence requires a conclusion that the normative evaluation of one’s action as negligent or not cannot be separated from the distributive results that this action entails. The egalitarian concern works at the duty stage as an excuse for not imposing liability for wrongful activity. In contrast, at the standard stage, it works as a justification that turns an otherwise wrongful activity into a legitimate one. My claim is that morally we should usually expect more care from the better-off than from the disadvantaged. Findings of negligence are based on the failure to balance properly between one’s interests and those of another. In deciding to what extent the defendant should burden herself in order to prevent a loss to potential victims, one morally relevant criterion is the relative ability of the injurer and victim to bear precaution costs and expected accident loss, respectively.

Almost seventy years after the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Donoghue v. Stevenson, the boundaries of negligence are still as blurred as ever. Some of the vagueness surrounding this tort is inescapable. It is an unavoidable price paid for the reliance on abstract, open-ended, amorphous, and incoherent notions. Indeed, there is no universal agreement even as to the meanings to be attached to the various components of this tort, such as the "reasonable person," proximity, and reliance. The boundaries of negligence are determined particularly through the filter of the duty of care. This article discusses the development of the concept of duty of care and the nature of negligence as analyzed through the prism of this duty.

Because they track the Model Penal Code, current criminal law formulations of risk offenses typically fail to distinguish the rule of conduct question—What risks does the criminal law prohibit?—from the adjudication question — When is a particular violator’s conscious disregard of, or his inattentiveness to, a risk in a particular situation sufficiently condemnable to deserve criminal liability? Instead, the formulations address only the second question — through their definition of reckless and negligent culpability — and fail to provide a rule of conduct provision to define a prohibited risk. This reliance upon culpability definitions as the core of risk-creation offense definitions is problematic because it fails to announce a useable conduct rule that describes those risks the law prohibits. Instead, this approach subjectivizes the definition of prohibited risks. What may be held "reckless" or "negligent" for one person may not be "reckless" or "negligent" for another person in the identical situation — an effect that strips case adjudications of their value in educating the community as to risks that the rules of conduct prohibit. Current risk-creation offenses also are problematic because they make results — including the creation of a prohibited risk — irrelevant to criminal liability. While this is consistent with the Model Code’s view that resulting harm is insignificant, that only culpable state of mind ought to affect liability, it is inconsistent with the view of most state code drafters. Thus, while the Model Code grades offenses without regard to whether a prohibited risk in fact is created, most state codes logically would want to grade lower in the absence of a prohibited risk. These two fundamental problems—the failure to distinguish conduct rules and adjudication rules and the confusion over the significance of results — are related. The Model Penal Code’s general failure to distinguish conduct and adjudication rules made it less likely that state code drafters would notice what they would have seen as the Code’s inappropriate subjectivization of risk and risk offenses. If the Model Code had systematically segregated conduct and adjudication rules, it would have been more obvious to state code drafters that the Code’s formulation of risk-creation offenses was one that they could not accept.

Negligence, the creation of an unjustifiable risk of harm, plays a pivotal role in both criminal and civil law. This article takes up two negligence-related problems unique to its role in the criminal law. The first has to do with its "harm" component, the second with its "unjustifiability" component. The first problem is why the criminal law distinguishes so sharply between negligent wrongdoing that results in harm and negligent wrongdoing that does not, when it does not distinguish equally sharply between intentional wrongdoing that results in harm and intentional wrongdoing that does not. The answer has to do with a peculiar feature in the logic of intention and with the symmetric way we ascribe responsibility for blameworthy and praiseworthy actions. My second problem is why the criminal law judges the blameworthiness of negligent actions on the basis of the harm wrought rather than the gap between the harm wrought and the justification for risking it. The answer has to do with a more general feature of the criminal law, the refusal to recognize "partial defenses" and "partial offenses."