Band 15, Heft 2

Although it is now widely acknowledged that Hegel’s political philosophy is based freedom, there is still divided opinion regarding the role of conscience within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right . In fact, it is often claimed that Hegel allows insufficient room for conscience (and thus subjective freedom) within the political realm he describes. This article responds to such criticism and argues that Hegel allocates an irreducible function for conscience within his political state. It begins by examining the emergence of conscience within the morality section of the text and then continues to establish what happens to the conscience during the Aufhebung of morality into ethical life (of which Hegel’s state is a part). It argues that, during this dialectical transition, all the essential moments of moral conscience are preserved in the true conscience of ethical life. This article puts forward a reading of true ethical conscience that combines its right to subjective reflection alongside its respect for objective institutions, thus demonstrating that conscience can operate as a meaningful part of Hegel’s political state.

The problem of the existence of negative facts as truthmakers for negative propositions was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1918. In the debate since then, most writers have tended to reject their existence, Russell himself being the most conspicuous exception. Two other strategies have been offered. The first, usually called incompatibilism, actually goes back to Plato, whereas the second, the totality fact theory, was introduced by D. M. Armstrong in 1997. The aim of this paper is to show the problematic character of some of the presuppositions shared by all three of the strategies mentioned above – presuppositions that figure in most of the current discourse on the subject. First, the concept of a negative proposition is not clear: one needs to make a distinction between grammatically negative propositions and “ontologically” negative ones. Second, it turns out that propositions may be ontologically negative in many ways, each of which may call for a different specific analysis with respect to the question of the existence of what would be the corresponding negative facts. Third, at the bottomline, it is shown that we need a concept of the existence or reality of facts that is not derived solely from their function as truthmakers. Such a concept, it is argued, is furnished by a theory that I shall call “ ontological consequentialism ”.

What significance should the subjective experiences of poor people have in a normative philosophical critique of poverty? In this paper, we take up this question and answer it by looking at two different normative theories: the capability approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and the recognition approach of Axel Honneth. While Sen and Nussbaum are largely quite reluctant toward the role of subjective experiences of poor people, the recognition approach views them as central for its social critique of poverty. We will defend the thesis that a more inclusive view on the role of the subjects of suffering and injustice is needed, that such subjective experiences and the unique first-hand knowledge it produces cannot be substituted by objective criteria, while such criteria are needed to bolster – and in some cases also criticize – the poverty knowledge of poor people.

Decision theory cannot be a purely formal theory, free of all metaphysical assumptions and ascertainments. It must instead rely upon the end user for the wisdom it takes to prime the decision formalism – with principles and assumptions about the metaphysics of the application context – so that the formalism in its turn can generate good advice. Appreciating this idea is fundamental to understanding the true rivalry between evidential decision theory (EDT) and causal decision theory (CDT) in specific cases. I shall argue that no decision theory can deliver a verdict unless assumptions are made about the degrees of freedom in the context of decision, that EDT and CDT disagree fundamentally about how to diagnose the degrees of freedom in any given situation, and that from this fundamental disagreement flow their surface disagreements in iconic cases.

Realist dialetheism is the view that there are contradictions in reality. One argument against this idea says that it is impossible because it has to make room for the possibility of a trivial reality, which is metaphysically impossible. Another argument against it says that the metaphysical structure of reality is such that it is impossible to have contradictions in it. I argue here that both arguments fail to establish the impossibility of realist dialetheism because they are based on a misconception about the notions of negation and contradiction, which leads them, in the first case, to wrongly hold that dialetheism has to be compatible with trivialism, and, in the second case, to assume that the validity of the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction prevents the existence of dialetheias.

What is the meaning of “meaning”, hermeneutically seen? How does the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer relate to the different types of meaning that are at hand in other branches of philosophy, such as sentence meaning within analytic philosophy, uttered meaning within speech acts theory and the communicative/dialogical meaning of formal/transcendental pragmatics? The comprehensive framework of Gadamer’s hermeneutics forms the horizon of understanding of this paper, and of specific interest is how these different types of meaning relate to the hermeneutic framework. Can a hermeneutical sense of meaning be elaborated in contrast to these different senses of meaning? Or, can these different types of meaning, in a certain sense, also be seen as compatible with the wider hermeneutical framework of meaning?

In this paper, I discuss some central ethical aspects of self-forgiveness. A first comparison is made between interpersonal forgiveness and self-forgiveness. It would seem that self-forgiveness follows much of the same structure as interpersonal forgiveness, although with some exceptions. One noticeable difference is that with self-forgiveness, the forgiver and forgiven is one and the same person. The main ethical question discussed is when self-forgiveness is morally permissible. I argue that self-forgiveness is only morally permissible when the wrongdoer acknowledges wrongdoing and display genuine repentance. He must also, insofar as possible, ask the victim for forgiveness before contemplating self-forgiveness.