Band 5, Heft 1

I argue that a circa first century B.C./A.D. anonymous epistolary comic novel depicting a fictional interaction between Hippocrates of Cos and Democritus of Abdera contains an insightful imitation of Democritus that can cast light on the historical Democritus’s thought, including his thought on the touchy subject of appropriate and inappropriate laughter. The only thing certain about Democritus’s view of laughter is that he denounced laughter at human misfortune as inappropriate. The later legend of him as laughing at everything and everyone indiscriminately is a later distortion of his view which the author of the comic novel seems concerned to counteract.

Ancient texts show Democritus as contemptuous and tradition represents him as a laugher. These two aspects of character are easily merged, as we see in Nietzsche, who in this regard is very much the heir of Democritus. The humor in Nietzsche's writings is not extraneous to his philosophy, but coextensive with his thought and an integral expression of his contempt for the targets of his philosophical attacks. Insofar as Nietzsche's humor is neither stylistic, rhetorical, nor intended to emphasize philosophical points antecedent to his process of joking about them, we cannot understand Nietzsche unless we get his jokes.

This essay proposes an alternative reading of David Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds ( OpW ) by drawing parallels between this book and a performance by Andy Kaufman, Andy Wrestles the Ladies ( AwL ). The proposed reading is ultimately grounded by a joke: that it is more credible to believe that similarly to Kaufman in AwL , Lewis impersonated a character in OpW by performing a reductio ad absurdum than to believe that he seriously defended modal realism. After all, to support this thesis is to face countless objections while showing varied lacks of awareness and justifying the attribution to oneself of Ostrichist. The latter abbreviates the predicate, “to act like an ostrich,” attributable to that which lacks varied kinds of awareness in acting in a way comparable to that of a bizarre ostrich that buries its head in the sand for no good reason.

The currently dominant view concerning humor ethics is punching up/punching down. According to this view, members of one community with less social capital are allowed to make jokes at the expense of another with more social capital as a means of achieving social justice, while those in a community with more social capital are forbidden from making jokes about those with less. The latter is considered an act of bullying, which further entrenches pre-existing social injustice. While there is value in the moral intuitions that underlay this view, it falls prey to several problems. A new approach, the joke capital approach, is introduced which has the virtue of accounting for the cases in which punching up/punching down is effective but also is capable of handling the problematic cases.

This article discusses the very common moral guideline “Punch up, do not kick down.” Our approach is based on humanistic ethics, and through rigorous philosophical analysis, we will show that while the guideline is commendable and well-intentioned, it does not work as a universal rule and should not be used as an ideological tool. Due to the complexity of our social reality and the fluid nature of hierarchies, there may be cases when punching up is problematic, and kicking down is acceptable. Our theoretical addition to the current ethics of humor is that we propose humor should be evaluated in terms of inclusivity and exclusivity as well. In this, Charles Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation will be indispensable.

This article traces the valuation of the ludic themes of laughter and play in the work of Jonathan Z. Smith, as debated by two of his interpreters. The question at stake is whether “religious” or “secular” thinking is more playful and open to humor. Sam Gill argues that a special form of play animates both certain forms of religion as well as an ideal form of secular theory. Tyler Roberts counters that Gill “domesticates” the ludic, and in doing so misconstrues the playfulness of religion. However, lurking behind the religious/secular dichotomy is a more fundamental question about the nature of the ludic, and what sort of power it possesses to transform human life. I show that the claim that theory is “secular” stabilizes certain ontological parameters about what human life could be. I turn finally to Nietzsche to interrogate an expression of ludic thought that pushes decisively beyond the human.

I argue that most of the pre-modern Chinese schools of thought contain elements of humor that can be analyzed in a differentiated and systematic manner. This article provides the first of two parts of this investigation. As a preparatory part, its scope is outlined on the basis of a traditional ideograph that represents the basic Chinese schools of thought as a whole. This is followed by an introduction to the present analytical framework. It is shown that it is compatible with the most basic ancient and modern concepts in the Chinese philosophy of humor. Based on this, the investigation turns to the Analects. It is shown that Confucius uses elaborate forms of humor as an allusive manner of teaching. Afterwards, the parallel Confucian refusal of comical entertainment and mass humor is discussed. A comparative discussion of evolved forms of humor in Confucian contexts and the Daoist classic Zhuangzi provides the transition to the more specific perspectives in the narrative of “Huzi, the Face Changer.” This is followed by a further in-depth comparison of Confucius and Zhuangzi’s high-level transformative humor. This leads to the discussion of the shielding function of humor as alluded to in the Daoist story of Hundun in the Zhuangzi.

I argue that a self-referential sense of humor is positively self-accepting by acknowledging imperfection, abnormality, or average status, without genuinely intending ridicule on oneself. Instead, standards of perfection, normality, and greatness are the implicit targets of ridicule, which can provide a form of bonding among those having this sense of humor, who can then find commonality amongst themselves and relief from the pressure of those exacting standards. This self-accepting sense of humor helps to make life more meaningful by facilitating contentment with imperfection both with respect to oneself and one’s situation. While a sense of humor can certainly be helpful for improving character, a perfectionist argument such as this should be balanced by acknowledgement of the value that can be gained from simply accepting ourselves just as we are.

It is often said that humor is a powerful tool that is helpful for living a good life. When saying this, we assume that humor is used sporadically for chance encounters with the spontaneously funny. In what follows, however, I lay out the educational premises of a new worldview, which, by making systematic use of self-referential humor in order to handle events that are not immediately funny, leads to a stable state which philosophers call the good life. The multifaceted philosophic notion of the “good life” will be reduced to the principles proposed below; but humor as presented here can help achieve any philosophical ideal, even one that is not in the spirit of the view articulated here.       However, the form of philosophic humor that I advance in this article requires education, mainly self-education, as is often the case with much successful education. Thus, as intimated by existential philosophers, I maintain, first, that laughter can and should be learned; and second, that the discipline of laughter is philosophically significant because laughter enables to endorse new norms and to change one’s attitude towards oneself, others, and the world. To achieve the educational aims of this article, the theoretical clarification of the worldview that I introduce, Homo risibilis or the ridiculous human being, is illustrated by exercises that help implementing it.