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This article proposes a metaethical route from neo-Aristotelian naturalism, as developed in particular by Philippa Foot, to virtue-ethical longtermism. It argues that the metaethical assumptions of neo-Aristotelian naturalism inherently imply that a valid description of the life-form of a species must satisfy a formal requirement of internal sustainability. The elements of a valid life-form description then serve as a normative standard. Given that humans have the ability to influence the fate of future generations and know about their influence, this article posits that our future as a species becomes a part of the description of the human life-form. Consequently, in our case, the sustainability requirement is extended into the future, leading to a minimal and humanist version of longtermism. As in Rosalind Hursthouse’s naturalistic virtue ethics, the focus of the proposed virtue-ethical longtermism remains on developing virtues as the only reliable way for the agent to achieve the good life. However, since what can count as virtue must be compatible with a life-form description that, taken as a whole, facilitates the long-term survival of our species, this position still implies a genuine longtermism, although it contrasts with the quantifying and maximizing logic of consequentialism.

Capitalism is defined as the economic structure in which decisions over production are largely made by or on behalf of individuals in virtue of their private property ownership, subject to the incentives and constraints of market competition. In this paper, I will argue that considerations of long-term welfare, such as those developed by Greaves and MacAskill (2021), support anticapitalism in a weak sense (reducing the extent to which the economy is capitalistic) and perhaps support anticapitalism in a stronger sense (establishing an alternative economic structure in which capitalism is not predominant). I hope to encourage longtermists to give anticapitalism serious consideration, and to encourage anticapitalists to pursue criticisms of capitalism’s efficiency as well as its injustices.

In this paper, I propose a refined version of Seana Shiffrin’s consent argument for anti-natalism and argue that longtermism is best justified not through the traditional consequentialist approach, but from an anti-natalist perspective. I first reformulate Shiffrin’s consent argument, which claims that having children is pro tanto morally problematic because the unconsented harm the child will suffer could not be justified by the benefits they will enjoy, by including what I call the trivializing requirement to better accommodate various criticisms. Based on this iteration of anti-natalism, I argue that future generations should not be seen as far away strangers who are merely anonymous bearers of well-being, but rather as collective victims of the wrongful acts of procreation. As a result, anti-natalism provides us with a rational ground to put a key moral priority on improving the future, not only as restitution to future generations for the unconsented harm imposed on them, but also as part of a long-term effort to nullify the anti-natalist criticism, since the consent argument would no longer apply if our society eventually becomes so utopian that the positive aspects of the average person’s life vastly outweigh its negative aspects.

The idea of public reason involves a standard of legitimacy that requires that laws and institutions be acceptable to all reasonable people, regardless of their conceptions of the good. Many philosophers have argued that public reason should be understood as an answer to the question of how to justify state coercion. However, some authors have criticized this traditional account because it overlooks noncoercive state actions that seem appropriate topics of public reason. More recently, some philosophers have defended the traditional account against that objection. In this paper, I argue that these approaches cannot effectively deal with that objection and offer a different version of the traditional account that can do so. This version rests on the ideas of overlapping consensus and stability. According to this version, the point of public reason is preserving an overlapping consensus on a coercive system of laws and institutions and achieving a stable society.

As an indirect ethical theory, rule consequentialism first evaluates moral codes in terms of how good the consequences of their general adoption are and then individual actions in terms of whether or not the optimific code authorises them. There are three well-known and powerful objections to rule consequentialism’s indirect structure: the ideal-world objection, the rule-worship objection, and the incoherence objection. These objections are all based on cases in which following the optimific code has suboptimal consequences in the real world. After outlining the traditional objections and the cases used to support them, this paper first constructs a new hybrid version of consequentialism that combines elements of both act and rule consequentialism. It then argues that this novel view has sufficient resources for responding to the previous traditional objections to pure rule consequentialism.

I argue that Harry Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency, properly understood, presents a plausible alternative to egalitarianism. My position may be more general than Frankfurt’s, insofar as he limits himself to economic sufficiency; on my view, insufficiency is a generic reason for the rejection of principles governing permissible behavior. By situating sufficiency within a contractualist framework of moral permissibility, I provide an alternative to common (and, I think, mistaken) characterizations of the doctrine of sufficiency as either subordinate to equality or primarily concerned with maximizing cases of sufficiency.

In this article I present two possible interpretations of Rawls’s assertion in A Theory of Justice that human beings have a desire to express their nature as free and rational. My reading hinges on different accounts of the Kantian conception of the person and of the Aristotelian principle and its companion effect. According to the first interpretation, this desire is a kind of natural predisposition inherent in all persons irrespective of the society in which they live. It has a universal and ahistorical aspect. The second interpretation sees our free and rational nature as an ideal that we strive to fulfill. This ideal appeals only to citizens of modern liberal democracies and entails a more qualified universalism. I argue that there is strong textual support for both interpretations but the second one is more consistent with the methodological framework of justice as fairness.

The marketplace of ideas is a colourful metaphor with a long history of being used to argue for freedom of speech. This paper draws on its historical antecedents to begin with an orthodox understanding of the metaphor whereby the absence of substantive regulation is taken to be conducive to the good functioning of both economic markets and public discourse. This anti-regulation reading is then challenged by analysing a series of legal cases showcasing prohibitions on misrepresentation and fraud. These speech regulations are explained by the economics literature on information asymmetry, which illustrates how honesty regulations maintain good market functioning by facilitating credible reliance by market participants on one another’s assertions. What is thereby proposed is a re-imagining of the marketplace of ideas metaphor which lends support to honesty regulations in the realm of public speech. One potential analogue for these legal and economic findings is identified in the work of Shiffrin and her arguments for deontological sincerity requirements in the public sphere.

Recently, there have been cases in which out-group representation in art has faced severe criticism. Out-group representation occurs when an artist in her work engages with people, characters, or subject matters that do not fall within her own identity group. This is exemplified by the case of finding a translator for Amanda Gorman’s The Hill We Climb in the Netherlands, where the original choice was criticized because, unlike Gorman, the translator was not Black, and by the case of Dana Schutz’s painting of Emmett Till in his casket at the Whitney Museum in New York, which was criticized for being painted by a White person who could not understand the suffering Emmett Till and his mother had gone through. A number of objections to out-group representation are identified in the debate, namely, an objection from authenticity, an objection from equality of opportunity, and the suggestion that out-group representation is disrespectful and/or harmful. It is argued that none of these objections establishes that it is morally problematic to engage in out-group representation in art per se, although, importantly, there are a number of moral concerns that those who thus engage should be sensitive to.

John Broome and Duncan Foley have proposed an ingenious way to transfer benefits backwards in time, from people who are not here yet to people who will not be here in the future. Present people can crowd out conventional, and often brown, investments by issuing global climate bonds (GCBs). The debate about GCBs has focused on whether it is justified to use this financial instrument to allow future people to buy off present people for climate mitigation. In this article, I ask whether it is fair to use GCBs to share the cost of a global carbon price between present and future people. My answer is that it depends on the approach used to calculate the carbon price and, of course, on the normative claims underlying the different approaches. Specifically, I argue that the internalisation principle underlying the cost-benefit approach does not justify intergenerational cost-shifting if, as in most cases, the social cost of carbon is determined using, inter alia, a social discount rate. Instead, the conservative justifications underlying a cost-effective carbon price consistent with the Paris mitigation target allow for intergenerational cost-shifting, but only to the extent of the difference (if any) between the Paris-consistent and the Pareto-efficient carbon price.

It is often believed that domestic principles of justice cannot ground freedom of international movement. Some argue that since principles of justice are not global in scope, justice does not require freedom of movement at the global level. This is problematic, for it confuses the grounds with the scope of justice. Given that the scope of justice is potentially global, freedom of movement must also be global in scope. Others have argued that the grounds of freedom of movement themselves are restricted in scope. If cooperation, democracy, and coercion are what presumably ground the right to freedom of movement, to the extent that they are not global in scope, freedom of movement need not be global in scope either. In this article, I argue that even if the grounds of freedom of movement are or should not be global in scope, freedom of movement must be.

This paper advances a Marxist critique of the politics of cancellation and raises concerns about the possible development of a cancel culture. Rather than delving into debates on freedom of speech, crucial though they are, this paper focuses on the pragmatics of the political tool – its goals, mechanisms, effects, and the underlying reasoning. From a Marxist perspective, it is essential to analyse cancellation and cancel culture holistically, considering their rationale, the mechanism, the objectives, and the impacts, along with their relationship to the material conditions of society. Such an analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of any historical development and argues that addressing political problems in the long term requires such a holistic approach, including the development of relevant productive forces. If cancellation evolves into a culture, it may give rise to a polity that reinforces market relations. Within the framework of historical materialism, this would be a case of the superstructure supporting the base, turning politics into a matter of private opinions, which is far from ideal. The paper concludes with some practical considerations.

Are private citizens ever morally permitted to abduct children and keep them in their custody, to protect them from their severely abusive or neglectful parents? Should private citizens face legal penalties for abducting children and keeping them in their custody, to protect them from their severely abusive or neglectful parents? In this essay, I offer arguments that support an affirmative answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second. Ultimately, I come out supporting a legal regime that keeps what I call defensive kidnapping illegal, but in which public officials may use discretion when enforcing laws that criminalize kidnapping. Under such a regime, children who were severely abused or neglected by their parents but saved by a loving, capable private citizen would be spared from admission into the precarity of the child welfare system.