Band 21, Heft 3

Increasing risks and crises present a challenging new normal for contemporary emergency management. It is important for public organizations to build robust government structures that can adapt to changing circumstances, rather than conform to rigid established procedures. Nevertheless, scholars have not fully explored how the transition to such robustness develops after crisis events. This paper fills the research gap by proposing an event-driven policy process model based on 171 identified crisis event studies, whereby a crisis drives learning that leads to changes in government structures or policy processes. Using a systematic review of the literature, we find that variation in crisis type and scale of impact influence subsequent policy dynamics that are critical to learning by governments. Key process dynamics (e.g. agenda setting, policy formulation, and implementation) and various types of learning are identified in the crisis-driven process that leads to robustness in public organizations. In addition, the role of scientific evidence and learning decay also play roles in this transition.

U.S. State Hazard Mitigation Plans (SHMPs) identify hazards, locate jurisdictional vulnerabilities and risks, and prioritize state hazard mitigation actions. As environmental hazards become more prevalent and costlier due to climate change, these mitigation plans and activities serve as critical decision-making tools for disaster risk reduction. This investigation systematically evaluates all fifty SHMPs on Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) quality. This assessment of HIRA quality examines three elements: (1) adherence to FEMA HIRA requirements; (2) incorporation of social vulnerability analysis; and (3) risk assessment methodology. The evaluation considers the new FEMA requirements and additional best practices to illustrate necessary improvements as states undergo revisions for their next SHMP update. Results find that most states meet a majority of FEMA’s plan requirements. Still, only twenty-seven SHMPs examine either social vulnerability or hazard risk at the sub-state level, and only seven states consider both. Ignoring sub-state variability in vulnerability and hazard risk can lead to misunderstanding true hazard risk at the local level, inequitable mitigation planning, and higher rates of future loss among underserved populations. Plans that employ a quantitative risk scoring methodology score higher on average, serving as best practice examples for SHMP improvement.

This paper explores perceptions of threat and the subjective ability to cope with belligerency in conflict zones using the diversity of Israel’s security arenas. Three research populations were defined, all adult residents in Jewish or mixed localities with a high probability of involvement in a security conflict or in which confrontations occurred between 2002 and 2014: residents of the northern border area ( n  = 385), residents of the Gaza area ( n  = 262), and residents of Judea and Samaria ( n  = 496). Stratified sampling was conducted in each population to generate representative samples. The fourth research population served as the control group for this study: a representative random sample of all Israeli residents aged 18 and over living in Jewish localities ( n  = 493). The main insight that arises from this study is that residents’ attitudes and understanding of the security situation, their perceptions of threat, and their ability to cope with threat are not exclusively shaped by concrete security incidents. Instead, their attitudes and perceptions are the product of multiple formative factors acting concurrently. In each region and population group, it is possible to identify a “cumulative context” that crystallizes from four key factors that shape residents’ perceptions: (a) the socio-economic background of the population and the community, (b) factors related to community organization, (c) geographic proximity to the source of threat, and (d) experience and memories of past events.

This study investigates the criteria affecting the location of humanitarian logistics distribution centers in the Sakarya province of Turkey, an area prone to natural disasters. The study identifies potential distribution center locations and uses the Best-Worst Method (BWM) to determine criteria such as population, distance to major highways and airports, public transportation availability, natural disaster risk, and suitable infrastructure. BWM is used to assign weights to each criterion and rank them based on their importance. The Additive Ratio Assessment (ARAS) method is then used to evaluate potential distribution center locations based on the established criteria. Disaster management experts and academicians provide their opinions through an online and face-to-face survey. Based on the results, Adapazarı is identified as the most suitable district for a humanitarian logistics distribution center. The study highlights the importance of considering multiple criteria when selecting distribution center locations and provides a framework for using multi-criteria decision-making methods in logistics planning. Disaster managers and policymakers can use the results to make informed decisions about the location of humanitarian logistics distribution centers.

The Chinese firefighting system has been transferred from military soldiers to professional civil servants since the 2018 institutional reform, and they have become a critical component of the newly established Department of Emergency Management. Studies on firefighters in China are limited, and this study can contribute to our understanding of the mental health and influencing mechanisms of emergency management workforces like firefighters, particularly in the context of institutional reform and a shortage of disaster workforce worldwide. This study investigates the associations between public service motivation (PSM), employee resilience, job satisfaction, depression and anxiety (DA) in firefighters. A questionnaire survey of 776 firefighters from two provinces, one from the north and the other from the south, was conducted. Chain-mediated regression models were used to analyze the associations. The results demonstrate that firefighters with more PSM have significantly lower depression and anxiety (beta = −0.215, p  < 0.001), higher degrees of employee resilience (beta = 0.946), and job satisfaction (beta = 0.633). Employee resilience and job satisfaction mediated the relationship between PSM and DA. Three indirect pathways were detected. First, a higher PSM is associated with higher employee resilience and lower DA. Second, a higher PSM is correlated with higher job satisfaction and lower DA. Third, the coefficients between PSM, employee resilience, job satisfaction, depression and anxiety are statistically significant. This paper provides a valuable contribution to the knowledge of human resource management and the well-being of the emergency management workforce.

Disinformation is not as intuitively understood in the security disciplines as those speaking about it seem to believe. Where we do find definitions, they vary considerably. As a result, the term has become politized and, instead, has lost value. Given the shallow roots behind classifying content as disinformation, it is not surprising that it has been sucked into the hyperpolarized maelstrom of politics and the media. That is unfortunate, given that disinformation is a demonstrated element of national power. Adversaries such as Russia have wielded the concept as an effective weapon to undermine and weaken rivals. Incorporating a framework through which disinformation can be identified anchors the term for security professionals. Without such an anchor, disinformation will continue to blow about aimlessly. I identify three criteria that a piece of content must successfully be passed through to qualify as disinformation. The first criterion is that the identity of the content originator is intentionally masked; second, the released information is harmful or destructive content intended to influence an outcome; and lastly, the originator has a predetermined political, military, economic, or social objective. Failure to defend disinformation and frame it properly leaves a confused homeland apparatus and weaker national security.