9. Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Introduction ix
4. Part I: Broad Perspectives on Corporate Governance
5. 1. Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function 3
6. 2. The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong? 26
7. 3. U.S. Corporate Governance: Accomplishments and Failings: A Discussion with Michael Jensen and Robert Monks 48
8. Part II: Internal Governance: Boards and Executive Compensation
9. 4. The Director’s New Clothes (or, The Myth of Corporate Accountability) 79
10. 5. Best Practices in Corporate Governance: What Two Decades of Research Reveals / 90
11. 6. Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues 113
12. 7. Is U.S. CEO Compensation Broken? 144
13. Part III: External Governance: Ownership Structure
14. 8. Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game 161
15. 9. Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors 170
16. 10. U.S. Family- Run Companies— They May Be Better Than You Th ink 184
17. 11. The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States 202
18. Part IV: External Governance: The Market for Corporate Control
19. 12. Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance 243
20. 13. Where M&A Pays and Where It Strays: Survey of the Research 280
21. 14. 14. Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control 307
22. About the Contributors 337
23. Index 339