The Constitution: A Basis for Bargaining

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Front Matter i
2. Contents v
3. The British Columbia Institute for Economic Policy Analysis vii
4. Foreword ix
5. Introduction xi
6. Acknowledgments xvi
7. Who Should Get Natural Resource Revenues? 1
8. The Constitution: A Basis for Bargaining 52
9. The Political Context of Resource Development in Canada 61
10. Equalization Payments and Energy Royalties 74
11. Note on Equalization and Resource Rents 108
12. Natural Resource Revenue Sharing: A Dissenting View 112
13. Resource Rent: How Much and for Whom? 118
14. Static Redistributive and Welfare Effects of an Export Tax 137
15. Taxes, Royalties, and Equity Participation as Alternative Methods of Dividing Resource Revenues: The Syncrude Example 153
16. A Comment on Natural Resource Revenue Sharing: The Links between Revenue Sharing and Energy Policy 181
17. Rent vs. Revenue Maximization as an Objective of Environmental Management 185
18. The Ontario Mining Profits Tax: An Evaluation 206
19. Governments and Mineral Resource Earnings: Taxation with Over Simplification? 214
20. Note on Federations and Risk Aversion 232
21. A Note on the Economics of Oil-Financed Recovery Projects 235
22. The Concept of a Nation and Entitlements to Economic Rents 240
23. The Volatility of Rents 246
24. A Comment on Decentralized Resource Control 250
25. Biographical Notes 257
26. Index 259