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Rethinking the Economic Model of Deterrence: How Insights from Empirical Social Science Could Affect Policies Towards Crime and Punishment
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Erik J. Girvan
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
29. Juni 2009
Game-theoretic models incorporating neo-classical economic assumptions can be a powerful tool for identifying and analyzing issues relevant to legal policy. In this paper I argue that, where those assumptions are deficient, the efficacy of and insights from such models can be improved by incorporating insights from experimental social sciences. Following this paradigm, I propose an expansion of the neo-classical deterrence model of criminal behavior to incorporate, as reputation effects, social scientific theory regarding the effects of in-group norms on behavior. Analysis of the expanded model shows that there are material differences between the classic and expanded models in predictions, the latter of which are more consistent with macro-level observations. I then discuss some substantive implications of the predictions of the expanded model for criminal legal policy.
Published Online: 2009-6-29
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Macroeconomic Instability and Corporate Failure: The Role of the Legal System
- Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law
- Does a Rise in Maximal Fines Increase or Decrease the Optimal Level of Deterrence?
- Benchmarks and Economic Analysis
- Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash
- The Problem of Shared Social Cost
- A Cost of Tax Planning
- Never Two Without Three: Commons, Anticommons and Semicommons
- Unavoidable Accident
- Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach
- Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three Strikes
- Corruption on the Court: The Causes and Social Consequences of Point-Shaving in NCAA Basketball
- Valuation of Quality of Life Losses Associated with Nonfatal Injury: Insights from Jury Verdict Data
- Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes
- Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence Theory
- The Structure of Incremental Liability Rules
- Firms' Motivations for Environmental Overcompliance
- Contingent Fees, Signaling and Settlement Authority
- Rethinking the Economic Model of Deterrence: How Insights from Empirical Social Science Could Affect Policies Towards Crime and Punishment
- Crime, Business Conduct and Investment Decisions: Enterprise Survey Evidence from 34 Countries in Europe and Asia
- Additive and Non-Additive Risk Factors in Multiple Causation
- The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance
- Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliberates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition
- Hybrid Licensing of Product Innovations
- The Effect of Endogenous Right-to-Work Laws on Business and Economic Conditions in the United States: A Multivariate Approach
- The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law
- Building Encroachments
- Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak
- Decision Analysis on Whether to Accept a Remittitur
- Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments
- Self-Defeating Subsidiarity
- Do Broader Eminent Domain Powers Increase Government Size?
