Pension systems in integrated capital markets
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        Alessandra Casarico
        
 
Abstract
The paper studies the effects on factor prices and welfare of the integration in a perfect world capital market of countries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems. It focuses on two large economies running respectively a pay-as-you-go and a fully funded pension system and it first analyzes the open economy implications of the different pension designs under the assumption that the pay-as-you-go system is balanced and in steady state equilibrium. It then elaborates on the institutional structure of the pay-as-you-go system to analyze how its degree of maturity, its expenditure profile and the presence of debt financing affect factor prices and welfare in open economy. Finally, it focuses on pension reform issues. The paper shows that, under perfect capital mobility, the differences in the degree of funding of the pension systems cause divergent welfare effects across generations and across countries. It shows that the design features of the pay-as-you-go scheme play a role in the world equilibrium and it identifies which of them can amplify or reduce the open economy linkages operating through the pension schemes.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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