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Asymmetric Vertical Integration

  • Stefan Buehler und Armin Schmutzler
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 4. Januar 2005

We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs.

Published Online: 2005-1-4

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1534-5963.1164/pdf
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