Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters
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Anna Boncompagni
Abstract
This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focussing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices. After the introduction, section 1 presents Miranda Fricker’s (2007) seminal work and points out that epistemic injustice typically involves the silence of discriminated groups, an aspect that emerges with most clarity when the figure of the doubter is considered. This is further investigated in section 2 with the examination of the film “Twelve Angry Men”, by Sidney Lumet. Some unsolved problems posed by Lumet’s film, rotating around the notion of reasonable doubt, are addressed in the following section through the Wittgensteinian metaphor of hinges as developed in hinge epistemology. Finally, by bringing together epistemic injustice and hinge epistemology, section 4 puts to the fore the importance of cultivating the capacity of attention towards radical doubters for understanding one’s own prejudices and promoting social transformations.
Included in N. Venturinha (ed.), Special Section on Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology.
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© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Front matter
- Titelseiten
- Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers
- Inhalt / Table of Contents
- Articles
- The Brown Book of Alice Ambrose
- Die Gewissheit der Orientierung
- Wittgenstein on Thinking as a Process or an Activity
- Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?
- Farbe und Raum
- A Brief Update on Editions Offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and Licences for their Use (as of June 2018)
- Special Section: Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology
- The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology
- Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters
- Knowing our own Body?
- The Myth of the Thinking Brain
- Wittgenstein and Scientific Representation
- Temptation and Therapy
- Making Ourselves Understood
- How Threatening are Local Sceptical Scenarios?
- Experience and Religious Belief
- „Das Buch ist voller Leben …“
- Back matter
- Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume
- Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Front matter
- Titelseiten
- Hinweis für Leser / Note for Readers
- Inhalt / Table of Contents
- Articles
- The Brown Book of Alice Ambrose
- Die Gewissheit der Orientierung
- Wittgenstein on Thinking as a Process or an Activity
- Möchte Chomsky erklären, was Wittgenstein beschreibt?
- Farbe und Raum
- A Brief Update on Editions Offered by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and Licences for their Use (as of June 2018)
- Special Section: Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology
- The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology
- Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters
- Knowing our own Body?
- The Myth of the Thinking Brain
- Wittgenstein and Scientific Representation
- Temptation and Therapy
- Making Ourselves Understood
- How Threatening are Local Sceptical Scenarios?
- Experience and Religious Belief
- „Das Buch ist voller Leben …“
- Back matter
- Die Autorinnen und Autoren des Bandes / Authors of this Volume
- Bisher erschienene Bände / Previously published Volumes
