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Property’s Sovereignty

  • Larissa Katz
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 26. Juli 2017
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Abstract

This Article argues that ownership is a form of authority that is constitutionally basic in liberal societies. At the same time, I argue, neither the particular benefits nor burdens that accede to the position of ownership are. By distinguishing between a principle of sovereignty, which I argue constitutes the core authority of owners, and a principle of accession, which I argue regulates the distribution of benefits (and burdens) attached to the position, we can see how this is so. Taxation, regulation, expropriation, by means of which benefits are withheld or burdens imposed, are not then attacks on property that undermine the position of ownership itself. Attacks on the office of ownership as such would be, rather, acts by the state that deny the basic sovereign authority of owners to set the agenda that regulates private activity with respect to a thing, e.g., by subordinating owners to the private choices of others.


*Canada Research Chair in Private Law Theory and Associate Professor, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, Toronto, Canada. I am grateful to discussion of the Article at the Private Law Theory Seminar Series 2014, Harvard Law School, North American Private Law Theory Workshop 2014, Harvard Law School, Symposium on Property and Sovereignty, Columbia Law School, 2015. I am grateful to Vincent Chiao, Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman, David Dyzenhaus, Chris Essert, Arthur Ripstein, Richard Stacey, Malcolm Thorburn, and Katrina Wyman for excellent comments.


Published Online: 2017-7-26

© 2017 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Heruntergeladen am 26.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/til-2017-0015/pdf
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