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The Impact of Behavioral Economics on the Law: Introduction

  • Christoph Engel EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 22. November 2021
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Abstract

Adopting the paradigms, findings and tools of behavioral economics has opened a promising avenue for legal research. This article sketches the broader framework within which the papers assembled in this special issue may be placed.

JEL Classification: D01; D90; D91; K00; C91

Corresponding author: Christoph Engel, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collection, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, D 53113 Bonn, Germany, E-mail:

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Published Online: 2021-11-22

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