Examining the Military Spending Economic Growth Nexus in the Presence of Informality: Evidence from the Balkan Peninsula
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Ourania Dimitraki
,
Kyriakos Emmanouilidis
und
Alban Asllani
Abstract
This paper examines the military expenditure (milex) economic growth nexus, in selected Balkan and peripheral countries from 1990 to 2022, considering the presence of informality within an institutional framework. Specifically, we employ Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to formulate an index of informality and use the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and Fully-Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) methods to identify the long-run equilibria. To provide a more comprehensive insight, the study also incorporates two types of causality tests – Dumitrescu-Hurlin and Juodis et al. – to determine the direction of the relationships. Our findings indicate that in the long-run milex can be detrimental to economic growth whilst informality boosts it.
![Figure 3:
Evolution (on average) of informality in our sample 1990–2022. Source: Authors’ own calculations [based on data form Elgin and Oztunali (2012) – updated by Elgin et al. (2021) – and Medina and Schneider (2019)].](/document/doi/10.1515/peps-2024-0029/asset/graphic/j_peps-2024-0029_fig_003.jpg)
Evolution (on average) of informality in our sample 1990–2022. Source: Authors’ own calculations [based on data form Elgin and Oztunali (2012) – updated by Elgin et al. (2021) – and Medina and Schneider (2019)].
Evolution of Milex, informality, and GDP growth for the sample individual countries 1990–2022. Source: Authors’ processing.
Definitions of variables and sources used for the informalitya index.
| Code | Variable name | Definition | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| LAW | Law and order (index 0–3) | It is scored as a single component with two parts. The risk rating assigned is six points with a minimum of zero. The “Law” element assesses the legal system’s strength and impartiality, while the “Order” element assesses public observance of the law. A nation’s court system may be rated three stars, yet its crime rate may be ranked one star if the law is habitually disregarded without effective enforcement (for instance, massive unlawful strike activity). | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
| INCONF | Internal conflict (index 0–4) | It assesses the level of political turmoil in the nation and its influence on governance. Most highly rated countries have no armed or civil opposition and no arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against their own people. A country in a civil war gets the lowest rating. There are three components that make up the risk rating, each with a maximum of four points and a minimum of zero. Four points = Very Low Risk, 0 points = Very High Risk. Terrorism/Political Violence; Civil Disorder. | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
| BUREAU | Bureaucracy quality | The quality of the bureaucracy acts as a shock absorber, in which it is reducing policy revisions when governments change. Thus, countries with strong bureaucracies that can govern without major policy changes or service interruptions receive high marks. In low-risk countries, the bureaucracy is usually independent of political pressure and has a well-established recruitment and training system. Changes in government are traumatic for policy formulation and day-to-day administrative functions in countries lacking a strong bureaucracy. | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
| INFLCP | Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) | It quantifies the proportional change in the cost of a set basket of goods and services to the typical consumer over a certain period of time. | World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) |
| MONFREE | Monetary freedom (index 0–100) | It integrates a price stability metric with an evaluation of price regulations. Market activity is distorted by both inflation and price regulations. Without microeconomic interference, price stability is the optimum situation for the free economy. | Euromonitor International |
| TIMEBUS | Time required to start a business (days) | It refers to the time in days required to complete all the formalities for starting a firm lawfully. | World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) |
| POVERTY | Population living below national poverty Line (% population) | It is the percentage of people who live below the country’s poverty threshold. Nationwide calculations are based on sample survey subpopulations estimates. Each nation has its own definition of poverty. | Heritage Foundation |
| CORRUP | Corruption (index 0–6) | This is a political corruption evaluation. Corruption is a danger to foreign capital for numerous reasons: it disrupts the financial and economic atmosphere; it decreases corporate and government efficiency by enabling individuals to obtain power by favour rather than talent; and it adds inherent political turmoil. The risk rating assigned is six points with a minimum of zero. Six points = Very Low Risk, 0 points = Very High Risk. | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
| INTERNET | Individuals using the Internet (% of the population) | Individuals who have used the internet in the previous three months are considered internet users. The Internet may be accessed via a variety of devices, including computers, mobile phones, PDAs, gaming consoles, and digital televisions. | World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) |
| PRORIG | Property rights (index 0–100) | The property rights component assesses individuals’ ability to accumulate private property. It assesses how well a country’s laws protect private property rights and how well its government enforces them. Additionally, it considers the risk of seizure, the independence of the court, and the capacity of people and enterprises to implement. The score is calculated on a scale of 0–100, with higher values indicating stronger protection of property rights. | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
| GOVSTAB | Government stability (index 0–4) | It assesses the government’s capacity to deliver and maintain power. Each sub-component of the risk assessment is assigned a maximum of four points and a minimum of zero. Four points = Very Low Risk, 0 points = Very High Risk. There is unity in government, legislative strength, and popular support. | The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) |
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aNumerous studies have reached consensus regarding the determinants of informal economy as being economic, political and institutional factors (Chen, Schneider, and Sun 2020; La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Medina and Schneider 2018).
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© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- The Economic Impact of Arms Spending in Germany, Italy, and Spain
- Defense Burden Sharing and Military Cooperation in the EU27: A Descriptive Analysis (2002–2023)
- Is Geopolitical Risk a Reason or Excuse for Bigger Military Expenditures?
- Asymmetric and Threshold Effect of Military Expenditure on Economic Growth: Insight from an Emerging Market
- Letters and Proceedings
- Examining the Military Spending Economic Growth Nexus in the Presence of Informality: Evidence from the Balkan Peninsula
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- The Economic Impact of Arms Spending in Germany, Italy, and Spain
- Defense Burden Sharing and Military Cooperation in the EU27: A Descriptive Analysis (2002–2023)
- Is Geopolitical Risk a Reason or Excuse for Bigger Military Expenditures?
- Asymmetric and Threshold Effect of Military Expenditure on Economic Growth: Insight from an Emerging Market
- Letters and Proceedings
- Examining the Military Spending Economic Growth Nexus in the Presence of Informality: Evidence from the Balkan Peninsula
