Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity
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Jochen Bojanowski
Abstract
David Estlund holds that ultimate normative principles are insensitive to bad facts. This is a deliberately twisted appropriation of Jerry Cohen’s famous dictum that ultimate normative principles are fact-insensitive. In this paper, I will show why Estlund’s twist misses the point of Cohen’s argument. The fact-insensitivity claim is not a requirement to eliminate all facts from our normative theories because facts necessarily make these theories concessive. Instead, it may help us to locate the true origin of these concessions. In normative theorizing, we have not explained why a fact supports a principle if we fail to articulate the higher-order principle in light of which that fact is normatively significant.
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© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Special Issue: Utopophobia; Guest Editors: Achim Vesper & Philipp Schink
- Editorial
- Introduction to the Symposium on David Estlund’s Utopophobia
- Articles
- Which Limitations Block Requirements?
- A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy
- Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity
- How Do You Like Your Justice, Bent or Unbent?
- In Defense of Wishful Thinking
- Replies to Critics
- Regular Articles
- A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism
- Refugee-based Reasons in Refugee Resettlement – The Case of LGBTIQ+
- The Irrationality of Stand Your Ground: Game Theory on Self-Defense
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Special Issue: Utopophobia; Guest Editors: Achim Vesper & Philipp Schink
- Editorial
- Introduction to the Symposium on David Estlund’s Utopophobia
- Articles
- Which Limitations Block Requirements?
- A Defence of Robust Idealism in Political Philosophy
- Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity
- How Do You Like Your Justice, Bent or Unbent?
- In Defense of Wishful Thinking
- Replies to Critics
- Regular Articles
- A More Liberal Public Reason Liberalism
- Refugee-based Reasons in Refugee Resettlement – The Case of LGBTIQ+
- The Irrationality of Stand Your Ground: Game Theory on Self-Defense
