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Causation without the causal theory of action

  • Elena Popa
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 2. November 2022

Abstract

This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation (of all sorts) has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version of Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better.

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Published Online: 2022-11-02
Published in Print: 2022-10-26

© 2022 Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences

Heruntergeladen am 13.1.2026 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/humaff-2022-0032/pdf
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