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No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method

  • Dima Grigoriev EMAIL logo und Vladimir Shpilrain
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 1. Mai 2012
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Groups Complexity Cryptology
Aus der Zeitschrift Band 4 Heft 1

Abstract.

We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as “zero-knowledge” in cryptographic literature. We call this “no-leak” authentication to distinguish from an established “zero-knowledge” concept. The “no-leak” condition implies “zero-knowledge” (even “perfect zero-knowledge”), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.

Received: 2012-02-07
Published Online: 2012-05-01
Published in Print: 2012-May

© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston

Heruntergeladen am 27.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/gcc-2012-0009/html
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