Abstract
Scholars commonly observe that lawmaking in Congress has transitioned from the textbook system of “regular order” in which power was decentralized in committees and lawmaking followed a formal process to one of “unorthodox lawmaking” characterized by the centralization of power in party leaders and a lack of formal process. It is debated whether this change marks a decline in Congress’s lawmaking capacity, or is a procedural adaptation that has allowed Congress to remain productive despite high levels of partisanship. In this article, we maintain that lawmaking in Congress varies along two dimensions: formality of process and centralization of power. We analyze non-spending bills added to omnibus appropriations packages to demonstrate that lawmaking on these bills is informal and decentralized. Rank-and-file members retain a capacity to place matters on the legislative agenda and authorizing committees retain gatekeeping and policymaking authority. The process through which add-ons are approved is also bipartisan. Our findings demonstrate that this style of lawmaking is a procedural adaptation used by members to pass legislation important to their districts and in which committees continue to play an important deliberative role.
Acknowledgment
Thanks are due to Jackson Gode, Curtlyn Kramer, Danielle Bates, and Natalie Smith for research assistance and to Jim Curry and Alan Wiseman for sharing data. Thanks also to audiences at the University of Georgia, the 2018 Center for Effective Lawmaking Conference at Vanderbilt University, the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the University of North Carolina, and the University of Maryland for helpful feedback and to the Hewlett Foundation for financial support.
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© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- The Forum: Spring 2023 Issue Introduction
- Articles
- Speaker Nancy Pelosi: A Master of the House
- The House Freedom Caucus, Kevin McCarthy’s Race for Speaker, and the Fate of Rules Reform in the 118th Congress
- The Speaker Election in the 118th Congress: A Procedural Review
- Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills
- The Partisan Dimensions of Earmarking in the U.S. House of Representatives
- After Dobbs: The Partisan and Gender Dynamics of Legislating on Abortion in Congress
- Disability Policy in the Contemporary Congress
- Out-of-State Donors and Nationalized Politics in U.S. Senate Elections
- Book Reviews
- Anna Gunderson: Review of Captive Markets. Accountability and State Prison Privatization
- LaGina Gause: The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- The Forum: Spring 2023 Issue Introduction
- Articles
- Speaker Nancy Pelosi: A Master of the House
- The House Freedom Caucus, Kevin McCarthy’s Race for Speaker, and the Fate of Rules Reform in the 118th Congress
- The Speaker Election in the 118th Congress: A Procedural Review
- Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills
- The Partisan Dimensions of Earmarking in the U.S. House of Representatives
- After Dobbs: The Partisan and Gender Dynamics of Legislating on Abortion in Congress
- Disability Policy in the Contemporary Congress
- Out-of-State Donors and Nationalized Politics in U.S. Senate Elections
- Book Reviews
- Anna Gunderson: Review of Captive Markets. Accountability and State Prison Privatization
- LaGina Gause: The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups