Startseite A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

  • Hide-Fumi Yokoo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 11. März 2020

Abstract

I develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the comments and encouragement from anonymous referees, Nguyen Ngoc Mai, and Klaus M. Schmidt, as well as for the comments from participants at the 2017 International Workshop on Social Preferences and Environmental and Resource Economics at the University of Manchester. This research project was supported by JSPS KAKENHI, grant number 17K18343 (Funder Id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001691).

References

Allcott, H., 2011. “Social Norms and Energy Conservation.” Journal of Public Economics 95: 1082–95.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.03.003Suche in Google Scholar

Allcott, H., and J. B. Kessler. 2019. “The Welfare Effects of Nudges: A Case Study of Energy Use Social Comparisons.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11: 236–76.10.3386/w21671Suche in Google Scholar

Barbier, E. B., M. Czajkowski, and N. Hanley. 2017. “Is the Income Elasticity of the Willingness to Pay for Pollution Control Constant?” Environmental and Resource Economics 68: 663–82.10.1007/s10640-016-0040-4Suche in Google Scholar

Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian. 1986. “On the Private Provision of Public Goods.” Journal of Public Economics 29: 25–49.10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1Suche in Google Scholar

Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. T. Normann. 2011. “A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences.” Games and Economic Behavior 72: 321–38.10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008Suche in Google Scholar

Bolton, G. E., and A. Ockenfels. 2000. “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.” American Economic Review 90: 166–93.10.1257/aer.90.1.166Suche in Google Scholar

Brandon, A., P. J. Ferraro, J. A. List, R. D. Metcalfe, M. K. Price, and F. Rundhammer. 2017. “Do the Effects of Social Nudges Persist? Theory and Evidence from 38 Natural Field Experiments.” NBER Working Paper No.23277.10.3386/w23277Suche in Google Scholar

Buckley, E., and R. Croson. 2006. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Voluntary Provision of Linear Public Goods.” Journal of Public Economics 90: 935–55.10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002Suche in Google Scholar

Croson, R., and J. Shang. 2013. “Limits of the Effect of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from Field Experiments.” Economic Inquiry 51: 473–77.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00468.xSuche in Google Scholar

Derin-Güre, P., and N. Uler. 2010. “Charitable Giving Under Inequality Aversion.” Economics Letters 107: 208–10.10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.026Suche in Google Scholar

Engelmann, D. 2012. “How Not to Extend Models of Inequality Aversion.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81: 599–605.10.1016/j.jebo.2011.08.007Suche in Google Scholar

Fehr, E., and K. M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817–68.10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.14Suche in Google Scholar

Ferraro, P. J., and M. K. Price. 2013. “Using Nonpecuniary Strategies to Influence Behavior: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” Review of Economics and Statistics 95: 64–73.10.1162/REST_a_00344Suche in Google Scholar

Fischbacher, U. and S. Gächter. 2010. “Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 100: 541–56.10.1257/aer.100.1.541Suche in Google Scholar

Fischbacher, U., S. Gächter, and E. Fehr. 2001. “Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment.” Economics Letters 71: 397–404.10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9Suche in Google Scholar

Frey, B. S., and S. Meier. 2004. “Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment.” American Economic Review 94: 1717–22.10.1257/0002828043052187Suche in Google Scholar

Shang, J., and R. Croson. 2009. “A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods.” Economic Journal 119: 1422–39.10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02267.xSuche in Google Scholar

Teyssier, S. 2012. “Inequity and Risk Aversion in Sequential Public Good Games.” Public Choice 151: 91–119.10.1007/s11127-010-9735-1Suche in Google Scholar

Uler, N., 2011. “Public Goods Provision, Inequality and Taxes.” Experimental Economics 14: 287–306.10.1007/s10683-010-9268-ySuche in Google Scholar

Warr, P. G. 1983. “The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income.” Economics Letters 13: 207–11.10.1016/0165-1765(83)90087-3Suche in Google Scholar


Supplementary Material

The online version of this article offers supplementary material (DOI:https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0066).


Published Online: 2020-03-11

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 18.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejte-2019-0066/pdf
Button zum nach oben scrollen