On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle’s Notion of an ‘Institutional Fact’
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Carsten Heidemann
Abstract
John Searle’s conception of institutional facts figures centrally in his latest works. It is defective for several reasons: (1) Searle’s argument for philosophical realism is inconsistent. (2) Searle’s conceptions of consciousness and collective intentionality are problematic. (3) The notion of normativity is indispensable in Searle’s system, but cannot be accounted for and makes wide parts of his theory superfluous. (4) It is not clear what entities might be regarded as institutional facts. These problems have a common source: The philosophical basis of Searle’s theory, his combination of realism and physicalist monism, clashes with his thesis that both the 'first-person-ontology' and normativity are irreducible.
© 1999 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gerechtigkeit
- Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ohne Verteilungsgleichheit
- Die ,sozialdemokratische‘ und die ,liberale‘ Variante der neoaristotelischen Sozialphilosophie
- Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Utilitarismus
- John Searle’s Social Ontology
- Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts
- On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle’s Notion of an ‘Institutional Fact’
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gerechtigkeit
- Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ohne Verteilungsgleichheit
- Die ,sozialdemokratische‘ und die ,liberale‘ Variante der neoaristotelischen Sozialphilosophie
- Autonomie, Charakter und praktische Vernunft: Überlegungen am Beispiel des Utilitarismus
- John Searle’s Social Ontology
- Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts
- On Some Difficulties Concerning John Searle’s Notion of an ‘Institutional Fact’
