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Justification: Reflexive and/or Discursive?

  • Petra Hedberg
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 19. März 2010
SATS
Aus der Zeitschrift Band 7 Heft 1

Abstract

This paper will deal explicitly with the positions of Habermas and Apel on the status of the consensual conditions of the discourse. My usage of the Habermas-Apel-debate will serve two functions. The first purpose is to accomplish a clarification of the problems attached to a purely discursive justification of the consensual conditions, which represents the approach defended by Habermas. Contrary to Habermas, Apel's approach includes two different levels of justification, i.e., reflexive and discursive, and conceives them as complementary, although principally different. The second purpose is to elucidate the strength of Apel's approach through the critical objections made by Habermas. Finally, I would like to distinguish between two different functions of the consensual conditions/meta-norms within Apel's approach: a validational versus a critical. Here, the topic of reflexive justification will be connected to the meta-normative status of the conditions, and to the difference between validation and critique.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2006-May

© Philosophia Press 2006

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