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Williamson on Knowledge, Action, and Causation

  • Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 19. März 2010
SATS
Aus der Zeitschrift Band 6 Heft 1

Abstract

In his Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Timothy Williamson argues that knowledge can be causally efficacious and as such figure in psychological explanation. His argument for this claim figures as a response to a key objection to his overall thesis that knowing is a mental state. In this paper I argue that although Williamson succeeds in establishing that knowledge in some cases is essential to the power of certain causal explanations of actions, he fails to do this in a way that establishes knowledge itself as a causal factor. The argument thus fails to support his overall claim that knowledge should be conceived as a state of mind.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2005-May

© Philosophia Press 2005

Heruntergeladen am 17.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/SATS.2005.15/html
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