Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter I
2. Acknowledgments V
3. Contents VII
4. Introduction 1
5. Abbreviations and Methods of Reference 9
6. Notes on Contributors 11
7. I. The Concept of the Highest Good and its Place in Kant’s Moral Theory
8. The Highest Good and the Notion of the Good as Object of Pure Practical Reason 17
9. Kant on ‘Good’, the Good, and the Duty to Promote the Highest Good 33
10. Kant on Happiness and the Duty to Promote the Highest Good 51
11. “Mixtum Compositum”: On the Persistence of Kant’s Dualism in the Doctrine of the Highest Good 71
12. The Determination of the Concept of the Highest Good 89
13. II. Kant’s Moral Arguments and the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason
14. God, the Highest Good, and the Rationality of Faith: Reflections on Kant’s Moral Proof of the Existence of God 111
15. Kant on “Moral Arguments”: What Does the Objectivity of a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason Consist In? 131
16. Kant, Mendelssohn, and Immortality 157
17. Life without Death: Why Kantian Agents Are Committed to the Belief in Their Own Immortality 181
18. III. Epistemology, Science, and Metaphysics
19. Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge 201
20. Must We Believe in the Realizability of Our Ends? On a Premise of Kant’s Argument for the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason 223
21. Applying the Concept of the Good: The Final End and the Highest Good in Kant’s Third Critique 245
22. “The supersensible … in us, above us and after us”: The Critical Conception of the Highest Good in Kant’s Practico-Dogmatic Metaphysics 263
23. Index of Names 281
24. Subject Index 283