7. Whom Did the East Germans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, Confrontation, and Détente in the German Democratic Republic, 1968–1989

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Tables and Figures ix
4. Acknowledgments xi
5. Introduction 1
6. I. The Personal Factor
7. 1. Untrusting and Untrusted: Mao’s China at a Crossroads, 1969 17
8. 2. “No Crowing”: Reagan, Trust, and Human Rights 42
9. 3. Trust between Adversaries and Allies: President George H. W. Bush, Trust, and the End of the Cold War 63
10. II. Risk, Commitment, and Verification: The Blocs at the Negotiating Table
11. 4. Trust and Mistrust and the American Struggle for Verification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1979 85
12. 5. Trust and Transparency at the CSCE, 1969–1975 102
13. 6. Trust or Verification? Accepting Vulnerability in the Making of the INF Treaty 121
14. III. Between Consolidation and Corrosion: Trust inside the Ideological Blocs of East and West
15. 7. Whom Did the East Germans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, Confrontation, and Détente in the German Democratic Republic, 1968–1989 143
16. 8. Not Quite “Brothers in Arms”: East Germany and People’s Poland between Mutual Dependency and Mutual Distrust, 1975–1990 167
17. 9. Institutionalizing Trust? Regular Summitry (G7s and European Councils) from the Mid-1970s until the Mid-1980s 198
18. 10. Trust through Familiarity: Transatlantic Relations and Public Diplomacy in the 1980s 218
19. IV. On the Sidelines or in the Middle? Small and Neutral States
20. 11. “Footnotes” as an Expression of Distrust? The United States and the NATO “Flanks” in the Last Two Decades of the Cold War 237
21. 12. Switzerland and Détente: A Revised Foreign Policy Characterized by Distrust 259
22. Conclusion 279
23. Contributors 289
24. Index 295