3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface ix
4. Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks
5. 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? 3
6. 2. The Game of Bank Bargains 27
7. 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks 60
8. 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking 84
9. 5. Banks and Democracy 105
10. Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada
11. 6. Crippled by Populism 153
12. 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain 203
13. 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis 256
14. 9. Durable Partners 283
15. Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains
16. 10. Mexico 331
17. 11. When Autocracy Fails 366
18. 12. Inflation Machines 390
19. 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil 415
20. Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives
21. 14. Traveling to Other Places 451
22. 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses 479
23. References 507
24. Index 549