ESSAY FOURTEEN. Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions Do Not Defeat Russell’s Theory of Descriptions

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. The Origins of These Essays ix
4. Introduction 1
5. PART ONE. Presupposition
6. ESSAY ONE. A Projection Problem for Speaker Presuppositions 23
7. ESSAY TWO. Presupposition 73
8. PART TWO. Language and Linguistic Competence
9. ESSAY THREE. Linguistics and Psychology 133
10. ESSAY FOUR. Semantics and Psychology 159
11. ESSAY FIVE. Semantics and Semantic Competence 182
12. ESSAY SIX. The Necessity Argument 202
13. ESSAY SEVEN. Truth, Meaning, and Understanding 208
14. PART THREE. Semantics and Pragmatics
15. ESSAY NINE. Naming and Asserting 251
16. ESSAY TEN. The Gap between Meaning and Assertion: Why What We Literally Say Often Differs from What Our Words Literally Mean 278
17. ESSAY ELEVEN. Drawing the Line between Meaning and Implicature – and Relating Both to Assertion 298
18. Part Four. Descriptions
19. ESSAY TWELVE. Incomplete Definite Descriptions 329
20. ESSAY THIRTEEN. Donnellan’s Referential/Attributive Distinction 360
21. ESSAY FOURTEEN. Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions Do Not Defeat Russell’s Theory of Descriptions 377
22. PART FIVE. Meaning and Use: Lessons for Legal Interpretation
23. ESSAY FIFTEEN. Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law 403
24. Index 425