Phenomenology & Mind

This volume presents a critical edition of the previously unpublished correspondence between Franz Brentano and Gustav Fechner along with a detailed introduction to provide context. A total of 11 letters (May to June 1974; October 1877 to January 1878) discuss in detail Brentano's critical arguments against Fechner’s psychophysics in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874).

This book presents the long-awaited critical edition of an unpublished manuscript of 277 pages containing Twardowski’s lecture notes on logic given in German at the University of Vienna. As to length, language and topic, this text is unique among the works of the author, who is renowned for his Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894), an influential but short book that has been out of stock for a long time already. In Logik Twardowski’s ideas are exposed in a much more extensive and interestingly revised form. The rest of Twardowski’s production is in Polish, a language inaccessible to many readers.

This edition will be of special interest to philosophers interested in the scientific philosophy in Vienna before the Wiener Kreis, to phenomenologists and anyone interested in early phenomenology and Husserl’s thought, to historians of early analytic philosophy, and particularly to specialists of Austrian philosophy and the continental analytic tradition from Bolzano to Tarski, for whom the book will be a truly indispensable source.

What is the relationship between perception and perceptual judgment? Does it involve sensual content that cannot be expressed verbally, or is it verbal structures that first allow us to recognize something? Both positions engender discomfort. In this systematically conceived examination grounded in the history of philosophy, Nolte uncovers the dogma underlying each of these positions and proposes alternatives.

Das Leib-Seele-Problem lässt sich im Rahmen der klassischen ontologischen Positionen - Materialismus, Dualismus, Idealismus - nicht befriedigend lösen. Es wird das Verhältnis zwischen Außen- und Bewusstseinswirklichkeit falsch aufgefasst, was zu einer falschen Konzeption der ontologischen Grundstruktur des Wirklichen Anlass gibt. Das Kernproblem liegt darin, dass vor allem materialistische und dualistische Denkgebäude auf einem naiv-realistischen Fundament beruhen, das nicht radikal überwunden wird. Dies führt zu etlichen philosophischen Ungereimtheiten, was in der vorliegenden Arbeit im Detail nachgewiesen wird. Dadurch wird auch die Basis für den „metaphysischen Dualismus“ geschaffen, in dessen Rahmen das Leib-Seele-Problem zumindest prinzipiell lösbar ist.

This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”.

The years of study on Husserl’s theory of intentionality have led to a number of non-equivalent interpretations. The present work attempts to investigate the most prominent of these by presenting both their advantages and difficulties. However, its key point is specifically the analysis of Husserl’s theory. This is made in several stages that are concerned with the relation between noesis and noema: whether it is one-to-one or many-to-one, the kind of transcendency and dependency between them, and whether noema supervenes on noesis. Moreover, Husserl’s theory is also examined in—usually ignored—instances of contradiction, nonsense and intentional conflict. The outcome is a fresh reading in which noema occurs as the possibly thinkable content capable of constituting multi-objective references and composed of pure X explained in terms of syntactic matter and form.

The articles in this volume discuss the relation between values and ontology, focusing on the significance of ontology for ethics and aesthetics, i.e., themes which due to the raising interest in ontology come to play a central role in contemporary philosophical debate. The contributors address the questions of whether and in which sense values can be considered to be real, whether it is possible to experience them, and in which sense we can speak about their objective validity. These topics – which were also discussed by early phenomenologists like Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, proponents of Gestalt psychology like Köhler, by Husserl, and by French phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty – are approached by both historical and systematic analysis.

While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano’s ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology.

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) gehört zu den polnischen Philosophen, deren Leistung weltweit breite Anerkennung gefunden hat. Von Husserl hat er gelernt, wie phänomenologische Analysen durchzuführen sind. Trotz dieser Verpflichtung seinem Meister gegenüber hat Ingarden niemals Angst gehabt, scharfe Kritik an Husserl zu äußern, die sich nach vielen Jahren in eine reife ‚realistische’ Position umwandelte. Der Weg zu dieser realistischen Position ist durch Ingardens Auseinandersetzung mit dem transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls gekennzeichnet, also mit der These „Die reale Welt und ihre Entitäten werden als rein intentionale Gegenständlichkeiten aufgefasst, die in den Tiefen des konstituierenden Bewusstseins ihren Seins- und Bestimmungsgrund haben“.

The book sets out to analyze the notion of a priori justification and of a priori knowledge. The most influential explanations of the a priori within the contemporary analytic tradition are analyzed. It is shown that the theories which group around the notion of implicit definition ultimately entail that the propositions which can be known a priori are to be analyzed along conventionalist lines. It is argued that the notion of objective a priori knowledge requires a commitment to the existence of a faculty which is the source of and justifies that kind of knowledge. The existence and functioning of this faculty cannot be explained within a strictly naturalistic set of constraints. Attention to the phenomenology of justification (validation) both of observational and purportedly a priori statements however reveals that the naturalistic demands are based on an asymmetry thesis among perception (and credited genuine sources of justification) and rational insight which is false. Therefore it is argued that a corresponding symmetry thesis must be accepted, according to which rational insight should be regarded as a justification-conferring faculty. In the final part of the book it is argued that Husserl’s conception of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and of concept constitution, allow for an objective interpretation both of analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge.

For a long time Franz Brentano has been widely perceived almost exclusively as the re-discoverer of intentionality and the founder of the continental phenomenology. It was only during the last 30 years that his immense importance for the development of analytic philosophy (and also the arbitrariness of the very division between analytic and continental philosophy) became clear. This volume is devoted to Brentano's influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: "Lvov-Warsaw School". Contributors: Arianna Betti (Amsterdam), Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Dale Jacquette (Pennsylvania), Dariusz Lukasiewicz (Bydgoszcz), Maria van der Schaar (Leiden), Peter Simons (Leeds), Barry Smith (Buffalo and Saarbrücken), Jan Wolenski (Cracow).

What is mind? What is its relationship to the physical world? Is consciousness a causative agent in the physical world? With much progress being made in the neurosciences, many have thought that these questions could be answered by reducing them to questions about physical systems such as the brain. But this approach has foundered on the core problem of consciousness: Why is it that some brain processes are accompanied by conscious awareness? This anthology points out new sources and unexamined paths of consciousness research. By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavours to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favour of new and more differentiated positions.

The study aims at exposing Meinong's ideas that may be of interest to analytic philosophers. It contains all the basic information concerning Meinong's theory of objects with a special focus upon 'objectives', which are Meinong's propositions. Meinong's theory of meaning and his epistemological views are discussed in detail. An outline of his conception of truth, which is classified as firmly realistic, is followed by a review of the critical works touching upon Meinong's epistemological ideas. Finally, Meinong's theory of objects is presented as inspiring the development of Meinongian logics, with his Aussersein as the prototype of an all-inclusive semantic domain. The issues considered include reference of terms and sentences as well as the general features of a Meinongian-style semantics.

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) belonged to those phenomenologists who never accepted Husserl's transcendental idealism. He devoted a great part of his intellectual energy to the "preparatory" analytical studies in which he hoped to develop an ontological framework suitable for an ultimate refuta­tion of Husserl's idealistic doctrine. In these works we find a rich arsenal of ontological tools which is interesting even for those philosophers who are not interested in the subtleties of the Husserlian tradition or esoteric dialectics of the idealism / realism debate. Contributors: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Gregor Haefliger (Fribourg), Guido Küng (Fribourg), Jeff Mitscherling (Guelph), Andrzej Póltawski (Cracow), Peter Simons (Leeds), Edward Swiderski (Fribourg), Amie L. Thomasson (Miami), Daniel von Wachter (Munich).

Viele Philosophen sind überzeugt, daß unser Wahrnehmungsbewußtsein phänomenale Charakteristika aufweist, die sich in ein physikalistisches Weltbild entweder gar nicht oder nur mit Schwierigkeiten integrieren lassen. Aber wie ist überhaupt unsere reflexive Einsicht erklärbar, daß unser Bewußtsein solche Charakteristika aufweist? An prominenten Beispielen läßt sich zeigen, daß dazu keineswegs die Annahme ausreicht, sie seien intrinsische Bestimmungen unserer Bewußtseinszustände. Vielmehr ist eine radikalere internalistische Konzeption der Inhalte unseres Bewußtseins erforderlich, wie sie Hector-Neri Castañeda entwickelt hat. Eine kritische Untersuchung von Castañedas Ontologie und Wahrnehmungstheorie liefert die Theorieelemente, mit denen die phänomenologische Reflexion erklärbar wird.

Dieses Buch beschäftigt sich mit verschiedenen Intentionalitätstheorien, die innerhalb der "phänomenologischen" Tradition entstanden sind. Diese Tradition beginnt mit dem Projekt der deskriptiven Psychologie Brentanos. Charakteristisch für sie ist die Betonung der Beschreibung dessen, was sich uns präsentiert, und was den Ausgangspunkt für jede theoretische Verarbeitung bilden soll. Die phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre fasst die sprachliche Intentionalität in der Regel als sekun­där in Bezug auf die ursprüngliche mentale Intentionalität auf. Unsere Worte sind - behaupten die Phänomenologen - nur deswegen bedeutend, weil sie psychische Akte ausdrücken, die ihrerseits ihrem Wesen nach intentional sind.

Das Buch beginnt mit der Lehre Franz Brentanos und die nächsten Kapiteln betreffen die wichtigsten seiner Schüler wie Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, Kazimierz Twardowski, Alexius Meinong und Edmund Husserl.

The history of twentieth century philosophy is characterized by the gap between analytic and continental philosophy - even though both have their roots in a tradition referred to as "Austrian" or "Central-European" philosophy. The essays in this volume show in historical and systematic studies, how a reassessment of this "Central-European" tradition can build an interesting bridge between phenomenology and analytic philosophy and, thus, create a new foundation that allows for an original perspective on central problems of philosophy

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science.