Ideen & Argumente

Philosophische Diskurse können auf verschiedene Arten und aus verschiedenen Gründen missglücken. Sind Streitende in einen bloßen Streit um Worte verstrickt, so liegt ihrem Streit keine Uneinigkeit zugrunde. Aufgrund eines sprachlichen Missverständnisses reden sie bloß aneinander vorbei.

Das vorliegende Buch entwirft in seinem ersten Teil erstmalig eine detaillierte Theorie bloßer Streite um Worte. Was zeichnet solch missglückte Streite aus? Und welche Indizien können den Verdacht eines bloßen Streits um Worte in der Philosophie stützen?

Im zweiten Teil des Buches wendet die Autorin die erarbeiteten Resultate dann in einer Fallstudie auf die Debatte um personale Identität an. Reden die beiden großen Streitlager der Debatte womöglich nur aneinander vorbei, weil sie Wörtchen wie „ich“, „wir“ oder „Person“ bloß unterschiedlich verwenden? Und besteht zwischen den Streitlagern also vielleicht gar keine Uneinigkeit darüber, welchen Persistenzbedingungen ‚wir‘ unterliegen?

Die vorliegende Studie etabliert diese Interpretation der Debatte als einen zumindest ernstzunehmenden Vorschlag. Sie möchte jedoch auch verdeutlichen, wie schwer sich der Verdacht eines bloßen Streits um Worte in der Philosophie wirklich redlich belegen lässt.

This volume conducts a defense of estate tax. Due to its progressive structure, tax is a tool well suited to counteracting growing economic inequality and, ultimately, to promoting various egalitarian ideals (political equality, equal opportunity). The defense rejects the most important objections against estate tax (property law, earnings, and family arguments).

Democratically adopted membership standards address not just the members of democratic territorial state but also non-members. This study therefore discusses whether restrictions to immigration are a democratic deficit, arguing that this is in fact the case when democratic states exclude factual members or infringe upon the egalitarian distribution of territorial rights.

Gibt es überzeugende Überforderungseinwände gegen anspruchsvolle moralische Auffassungen? In der vorliegenden Abhandlung werden Überforderungseinwände sorgfältig charakterisiert, systematisch eingeordnet und argumentativ verteidigt. Unter Berücksichtigung der wichtigsten Beiträge zum Thema wird gezeigt, dass gewisse Moraltheorien oder -prinzipien zurückgewiesen werden können, weil sie zu viel von einzelnen Personen verlangen. Wenn moralische Forderungen die Grenzen dessen übersteigen, was vernünftigerweise von Menschen erwartet werden kann, dann lassen sie sich als zu anspruchsvoll kritisieren. Im Hinblick darauf, was für eine erfolgreiche Verteidigung von Überforderungseinwänden erforderlich ist, werden intuitionen-, theorie- und erklärungsbasierte Strategien geprüft. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass Überforderungseinwände verteidigt werden können, wenn sich eine grundlegende und eigenständige Erklärung dafür finden lässt, weshalb anspruchsvolle moralische Auffassungen überfordernd sein können. In Auseinandersetzung mit den Ansätzen von Bernard Williams, Douglas W. Portmore und Samuel Scheffler wird daher ein entsprechender Vorschlag ausgearbeitet, der weder zu schwach noch zu stark oder zu wenig gut begründet ist.

How ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)—the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it’s true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.

Vertrauen ist aus unserem Leben nicht wegzudenken. Es stellt die Bedingung für zentrale Formen der Kooperation dar und ist Bestandteil unserer persönlichen Beziehungen. Was ist Vertrauen aber? Und wann haben wir Gründe, anderen Personen zu vertrauen? Das Buch setzt sich mit diesen fundamentalen Fragen aus einer philosophischen Perspektive auseinander und nimmt die Dynamiken in den Blick, die charakteristisch für Vertrauensbeziehungen sind.

Expressivism has been dominating much of the metaethical debate of the past three decades. The aim of this book is to address a number of questions that have been neglected in the previous discussion.These primarily concern the psychological commitments and the methodological status of expressivism as well as important differences and similarities between the approaches of the ‘classic’ expressivists Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn und Gibbard.

The Human Right to Democracy is the first major study to offer a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the debate. It reconstructs the relevant positions in that debate, identifies the key points of disagreement, and proposes an understanding of the human right to democracy that might form the basis of a wide consensus. The book rejects the idea of a comprehensive right to democratic institutions, and instead argues for a minimal “human right to democracy” which is best understood as an individual’s right to voice. The human right to voice is a right, enjoyed by any individual independently of his or her place of residence or nationality, to be heard and supported in cases of severe injustice that is tolerated or condoned by the political community or polity of which the individual is a member. By bringing together human rights discourse and democratic theory, as well as taking into account practical politics, this study broadens the scope of the debatefrom a sometimes overly-narrow focus. The book is of interest not only to political philosophers, but also to international lawyers, diplomats, representatives of civil society, human rights activists, and specialists in development economics.

We need a globalisation that is more just – this insight is true, but utopian. However, this work aims to ground a realistic hope for a cosmopolitan order by reconstructing a human rights approach to global justice. The human rights regime has already universalized a political conception of justice based on a cosmopolitan idea of human dignity and equal political and social rights.

The act of reproaching another is a common element of day-to-day life. Yet moral reproach also plays an important role in fundamental philosophical debates. This study examines the nature, appropriateness, and value of moral reproaches, and asks who is in the right position to raise moral objections. Finally, it looks at the relationship between moral reproaches and responsibility.

In many ways, determinism would seem to be irreconcilable with our self-understanding. What are these ways, and how precisely do they clash with determinism? Is this clash real or merely apparent? And how exactly might indeterminism be helpful? This study explores the diverse implications of these questions.

What does it mean to be an autonomous person? Starting from a philosophical riddle of personal autonomy, and challenging contemporary approaches, this book argues for the claim that AUTONOMY is a thick normative concept which stands for a particular kind of practical authority. On this basis, the book develops a conception of autonomy that solves the riddle and provides an adequate account of personal self-determination.

Unreflective action conceals an unexpected rationality of everyday life. Yet can we analyze unreflective action using terms such as “intention” and “conviction?” Are individuals responsible for their unreflective action, too, if they do not stand behind it with their conscious intent? To answer these questions, this study undertakes a fundamental reconceptualization of human action.

How does perceptual experience make us knowledgeable about the world? In this book Nadja El Kassar argues that an informed answer requires a novel theory of perception: perceptual experience involves conceptual capacities and consists in a relation between a perceiver and the world.
Contemporary theories of perception disagree about the role of content and conceptual capacities in perceptual experience. In her analysis El Kassar scrutinizes the arguments of conceptualist and relationist theories, thereby exposing their limitations for explaining the epistemic role of perceptual experience. Against this background she develops her novel theory of epistemically significant perception. Her theory improves on current accounts by encompassing both the epistemic role of perceptual experiences and its perceptual character. Central claims of her theory receive additional support from work in vision science, making this book an original contribution to the philosophy of perception.

Die aus dem Alltag bekannte Charaktereigenschaft stellt die Handlungstheorie und Moralphilosophie seit der Antike an vor zahlreiche Rätsel. Von verschiedener Seite wurde bezweifelt, dass eine kohärente Konzeption von Willensschwäche, die sowohl dem alltäglichen Begriff als auch reflektierten handlungstheoretischen wie moralphilosophischen Grundsätzen gerecht wird, überhaupt möglich ist. Dabei taucht das Phänomen in unterschiedlicher Gestalt in verschiedenen Wissenschaften auf: als Problem irrationaler Weisen der Diskontierung (Ökonomie), als mangelnde motivationale Kraft (Psychologie) und schließlich in seiner Reinform als Handeln wider das eigene, bessere Urteil (Philosophie). Hauptsächliches Ziel dieser systematischen Untersuchung ist daher die Entwicklung einer solchen kohärenten Konzeption von Willensschwäche sowie ein besseres Verständnis derselben hinsichtlich grundlegender Theorien des Handelns und Urteilens von Personen.

In Kapitel I werden verschiedene Weisen der Begriffsbestimmung von Willensschwäche verglichen und diskutiert. In Kapitel II wird in die zentralen philosophischen Probleme mit Willensschwäche anhand von Aristoteles und Donald Davidson, eingeführt. Schließlich wird das Phänomen der Willensschwäche in vier philosophischen Problemfeldern diskutiert: das Verhältnis von Evaluation und Motivation; die Intentionalität von willensschwachen Handlungen und die Frage, ob solche Handlungen aus Gründen erfolgen und wie diese beschaffen sind; die Verantwortung für willensschwache Handlungen und ob eine solche überhaupt gerechtfertigt ist; schließlich die Frage nach der Normativität von Willensschwäche, also weshalb wir vermeiden sollten, willensschwach zu sein, sowie Fragen zur Natur von praktischer Irrationalität. Als Ergebnis der Untersuchung stellt sich heraus, dass Willensschwäche möglich ist, da neben rationalen Akten der Selbstbestimmung auch präreflexive Strebungen auf unser Handeln Einfluss nehmen können.

Der methodologische Ansatz der Untersuchung, die Kombination aus handlungstheoretischen und moralphilosophischen Fragestellungen unter Berücksichtigung ähnlicher Debatten in Psychologie und Ökonomie, erschließt umfassend und systematisch die vielfältigen Aspekte von Willensschwäche. Die Analyse dieser Form von praktischer Irrationalität erlaubt zudem produktive Rückschlüsse auf zahlreiche andere philosophische Problemfelder und erweitert unsere Auffassung der Struktur unseres rationalen Denkens und Handelns.

How have computers and simulation models changed scientific practice? Johannes Lenhard examines the methodology and epistemic nature of computer simulations. The conception of mathematical modeling that has so dominated modern science is undergoing redefinition: theory and technology are becoming inseparably connected, thereby resulting in a convergence of the natural and engineering sciences.

This book offers new readings of Kant’s “universal law” and “humanity” formulations of the categorical imperative. It shows how, on these readings, the formulas do indeed turn out being alternative statements of the same basic moral law, and in the process responds to many of the standard objections raised against Kant’s theory. Its first chapter briefly explores the ways in which Kant draws on his philosophical predecessors such as Plato (and especially Plato’s Republic) and Jean-Jacque Rousseau. The second chapter offers a new reading of the relation between the universal law and humanity formulas by relating both of these to a third formula of Kant’s, viz. the “law of nature” formula, and also to Kant’s ideas about laws in general and human nature in particular. The third chapter considers and rejects some influential recent attempts to understand Kant’s argument for the humanity formula, and offers an alternative reconstruction instead. Chapter four considers what it is to flourish as a human being in line with Kant’s basic formulas of morality, and argues that the standard readings of the humanity formula cannot properly account for its relation to Kant’s views about the highest human good.

What reliably characterizes political decisions that serve the common good? Based on insights from ethics and the political sciences, the author develops a theory that integrates procedural and substantive criteria to define the common good. The theory suggests that political decisions serve the common good when they are democratically authorized and do not violate minimum standards in terms of interests and processes.

What are the connections between the notion of time and personal identity? This study examines three key concepts in discussions about personal identity: memory, survival, and responsibility. The analysis shows that for each individual, it is temporal, perspectival self-reference that forms the core of the conceptual relationship between time and personal identity.

How can an ego-less sense of the self be created? How is the step to self-awareness accomplished? And how does an emotional response become a value judgment? The author examines such transitional moments between various manifestations of mind. She reflects upon the role of language as well as the idea of intentionality as an element in the theory of emotions, the theory of linguistic meaning, and the philosophy of mind.

Liberal neutrality has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in. On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect for their different cenceptions of the good life. This book defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of citizens as free and equal persons. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value”. Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens, the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account.

Are there strong positive obligations? We obviously consider it a strong obligation to save a drowning child. The first part of this work investigates the factors that define the strength of such an obligation to help and how this is to be differentiated from actions that transcend obligation and from charitable obligations. The second part examines the question whether this case can be transposed to our relationship with those suffering from poverty and cites morally relevant factors that differentiate the cases.

The term “negative causality” denotes a highly controversial problem in metaphysics: Can negative entities such as the absence or the non-occurrence of certain events be causes or causal factors? This question is situated at the intersection of a series of fundamental questions that transcend disciplinary boundaries, questions concerning not only the nature of causality, actions, and events, but also the relationship between causality and moral and legal responsibility. This book is intended for philosophers, legal theorists, and theorists of science.

Is there a fundamental difference between practical and theoretical knowledge? The thesis, going back to Gilbert Ryle, that “knowing-how” is an independent form of knowledge manifesting itself in practical abilities that cannot be reduced to “knowing-that” (propositional knowledge) is a heated topic of debate in contemporary philosophy. This book presents an analysis of practical knowledge understood as an independent form of knowledge with systematic connections to knowledge, thought, and action.

Targeted killing of terrorists has become an established practice in the fight against terrorism. The disturbing consequences of the practice and its increasing political and societal acceptance raise questions as to its justifiability and its place in counter-terrorism.

Anna Goppel explores whether targeted killing of terrorists can be justified, both from a moral and an international legal perspective. She discusses moral and international legal limits to state use of lethal force and argues that the moral principles and the international legal regulations allow for the practice only in very specific, very rare, and rather hypothetical cases. The analysis is based on a thorough discussion of the human right to life, the laws and ethics of war, and the relevant moral and legal arguments. This makes it of particular interest to philosophers and legal theorists interested in terrorism, counter-terrorism, human rights, and the legitimacy of defensive state measures.

"Nicht nur der Historische Materialismus ist uns insgeheim in Fleisch und Blut übergegangen, wie ich bereits behauptet habe. Wir sind durchaus auch latente Anhänger der guten alten Theorie vom Klassenkampf ..."

Mit diesem Buch liegt eine beachtenswerte Neuinterpretation zentraler Teile des Marxismus - der Marx'schen Geschichts- und Gesellschaftstheorie - vor.

In einem ersten Schritt lässt Iorio Widersprüche und Mehrdeutigkeiten im Denken von Marx sichtbar werden. Es gelingt dem Autor jedoch, diese Widersprüche im Rahmen einer einheitlichen Theorie der Gesellschaft und des gesellschaftlichen Wandels zu überwinden, die vor allem darum bemüht ist, eine tief greifende Spannung zwischen dem Historischen Materialismus und dem marxistischen Konzept des Klassenkampfes aufzulösen. Diese Auflösung zeigt, wie die über-individualistisch strukturalistischen Aspekte des Historischen Materialismus mit Marxens Überzeugung zu versöhnen sind, dass menschliche Individuen Gesellschaften konstituieren und selbst ihre Geschichte machen.

This work undertakes an innovative analysis of the feelings of shame and guilt. These feelings do not merely involve self-critical judgment. Instead, they are a form of anxiety about loss of recognition. People who achieve recognition have authority, and such authority is not based solely on good arguments. As a consequence, we should question whether feelings of shame and guilt are truly reconcilable with the ideal of autonomy.

A study of the reasons why people act and the rules they follow in their actions shows what reasons and rules are: very different things. A rule per se is not a reason to follow the rule. From this assertion, social, moral and legal-philosophical and normative-theoretical conclusions can be drawn, which to a great extent give a new structure to practical philosophy. A conception of morality based on reasons and a conception of law based on rules fit into this structure.

The book provides the first systematic analysis of the question of responsibility for historical injustice since the publication of Karl Jaspers’ The Question of Guilt. Using the methods of modern philosophical analysis, it investigates the reasons and limits of moral and criminal responsibility and offers suggestions for solving the problem of compensation for past injustice.

Nearly one billion people worldwide suffer from hunger. This book examines the question of what inhabitants of wealthy counties owe these people. The author focuses less on the question of how a better world can be created and more on the question of what well-off individuals are obligated to do in light of this obvious injustice and immense suffering. The book argues for a common responsibility to eliminate extreme poverty and speaks to individuals in their roles as citizens, consumers, and even moral subjects.

It is often believed that it is rational to behave morally because it is irrational to break moral norms. Against this commonly held view, the author argues that rationality prescribes that it is always permissible to act morally, but in cases where rational self-interest conflicts with moral norms, both moral and immoral actions can be rational.

Separatism has become an important issue in international politics, as events like the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have demonstrated. This book investigates whether the secession of democratic states can be justified. Beginning with a critical analysis of current philosophical and people’s rights debates, the author develops his own legitimation theory. Drawing on the fundamental values of modern democracies, the author argues that a right of secession should be recognized.

A lot depends on a clear understanding of feelings: success in relationships and the possibility of a self-determined life, for example. The author asks what it means to understand one’s own as well as other’s emotions, how this understanding works and to what extent it is possible. The following issues are discussed: what is an emotion, how did they come to be, what effects do they have, and how authentic are they? Emotions and understanding are explained in relation to one another. The subtle answer, illustrated with numerous examples, is a contribution to the philosophy of psychology as well as hermeneutics.

Talk of coherence in ethics is popular. Particularly when dealing with the justification of ethical judgments, one frequently refers back to a concept of coherence. However, the question as to the exact meaning of the term “coherence” is seldom posed. This book provides a comprehensive answer.

The author shows that there is not a single concept of coherence in ethics. Rather, the word “coherence” is used to refer to many different concepts that neither can be reduced to one another nor imbedded in a single unified coherence theory.

This work is to be understood from the systematic perspective as an extension of John Rawl’s Theory of Justice . Constituting a normative vanishing-point, the individual’s moral self-respect is placed at the centre of the theory’s justification. Starting from the thesis that self-respect presents itself as the highest good, the book defends a number of fundamental moral rights that need to be realized legally, economically, culturally, and politically so that a person can maintain her self-respect.

One can justify moral rules on the basis of their advantageousness without equating morality and advantage. In order to substantiate this thesis, the author shows how grounding moral rules through their advantages harmonizes with a theory of moral judgements as expressions of moral feelings.

What is Man? The author deals with this question on the basis of the structural elements which appear to constitute our prior understanding of ourselves and the world – for example the idea of a conscious subject as a person interacting with others in the objective world or as a morally responsible actor – and the rational relations between these elements. The traditional framework of such studies is extended in the present work by taking account of more recent psychological debates in addition to philosophical approaches.

This study investigates the conditions of legitimate rule and argues that legitimacy can only be realized in a tiered global order. It criticizes theories of justice, democratic theory, legal philosophy, and philosophy of human rights and international relations, while developing a conception of transnational democracy. This conception connects states and other forms of organization into a global legal network that guarantees conditions of freedom in and between states.

One building block is placed on top of another one, an atom of sodium combines with an atom of chlorine. Do new things result in each case? Or, to put it more generally, under what conditions do various parts form a material object, i.e. a substance? Hübner addresses the problem by developing separate analyses for the composition of masses, bodies, artefacts and living organisms.

The first main line of argument develops analyses for the species named above and discusses their existence against the touchstone of classic puzzles, such as that of the ship of Theseus. The second main line of argument starts from the discussions of four-dimensionalism and the problem of vagueness to reject the views that the formation of complex structures under any particular conditions is either given or not given.

Hübner introduces a current international debate to German readers.

The notion of a living being is one of the basic concepts of our everyday ontology. Biology may be the science of living beings, but it is not the science of what it is to be a living being. Answering this question is the business of metaphysics. The author undertakes a thorough study of the ontological status of living beings. She opposes the Cartesian idea of living beings as bodies, arguing instead for a view which is based on the Aristotelian concept of substance. For this she first defends the general category of continuants (enduring entities) against objections of process-ontologists. She then goes on to show why living beings cannot be categorized as things, but form a separate category of continuants.

[Historical Justice] Lukas H. Meyer develops a theory of historical justice, based on intergenerational duties. According to the author the actions of people living in earlier times can account for the rights and duties of people living today.

[Doing Things for Reasons] What exactly are the reasons for our actions, and how are they related to the results of these actions? The conventional doctrine is that these reasons are mental states of the actant, such as volition or opinion, but here a new thesis is developed; according to Bittner, our actions are motivated by states or events in the world. This answer, worked out and defended in detail, leads ultimately to a radical new conception of ourselves as actants.

Christian Hiebaum examines the political dimension of legal argumentation. He shows how two prevalent beliefs which seem to contradict one another are, in fact, compatible: the belief that the application of law is a political undertaking, and the belief that those who apply law necessarily act in a truth-oriented manner. This demands a thorough analysis of the interpretation of legal standards on the one hand, and of the concept of common welfare and its role in legal discourse on the other. Overall, the analysis is set up as a deconstruction of Dworkin's distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of policy. In contrast to similar projects, this analysis does not flow into convenient skepticism or relativism.

If Plato is wise, then at least three elements are involved - Plato, wisdom and Plato's wisdom. These are exemplary representatives of three ontological categories (substance, universal quality, particular quality) which are fundamental to our orientation in the world. Drawing on aspects of language philosophy and logic, Schnieder develops a conception of these categories and their interconnections.

The book is also suitable as a general critical introduction for readers without special grounding in ontology.

We live in a world full of dangers. Human life is at risk from criminal dictatorships, terrorist attacks, technical disasters and catastrophes of various kinds. In an emergency, is it legitimate to counter such perils if that means that innocent life has to be taken or put at risk of death?

The book gives a moral philosopher's response to this politically, ethically and legally controversial question.

"Emotions such as fear, shame, distrust are such an integral part of human existence that it is difficult to imagine what a human life would be like without them."

What are emotions? How do we recognize them in ourselves and in others? In this book, Christiane Voss develops a theory of "narrative emotions". In her view, emotions are always based on a common structure, they are registered in a narrative and representational context of meaning. Voss provides both a historical and systematic introduction to this field.

Sollten muslimische Lehrerinnen im Unterricht ein Kopftuch tragen dürfen? Ist es gerecht, wenn Frauen bei der Vergabe von Arbeitsplätzen bevorzugt werden? Sollten die Kinder der Amish von der Schulpflicht befreit sein?

Rechte von Minderheiten beschäftigen zunehmend die aktuelle Rechtsprechung und Politik. In der philosophischen Debatte sind sie nicht zuletzt deswegen so umstritten, weil sie dem Gleichheitsgedanken zu widersprechen scheinen. Es zeigt sich jedoch, dass die Anerkennung von Minderheitenrechten unter bestimmten Umständen moralisch gefordert ist.

What is a "good" explanation? By what criteria is one argument more plausible, or "truer" than another? Conclusions regarding the best explanation (abduction conclusion) play a decisive role in both everyday and scientific and academic life. Klärner discusses previous conceptions of explanation in a critical and precise manner. Examples make it easy to follow the structure of the argument, its strengths and weaknesses.

This first German publication on the topic is likely to become the reference work on the conclusion regarding the best explanation.

Handlungen, mit denen wir mehr Gutes tun, als unsere Pflicht ist, heißen in der Ethik supererogatorisch. Die Autorin steckt einen Rahmen für Theorien der Supererogation ab. In jenem Rahmen dokumentiert sie die Geschichte dieses Begriffes und würdigt aktuelle Theorien - um deren Beschränkungen zu überwinden. Auch wenn wir über das Gebotene hinausgehen, so ihre These, können wir fehlen; wir können uns neue Pflichten einhandeln.

"Demokratische Systeme sind auch dann, wenn sie den grundrechtlichen Forderungen politischer Gerechtigkeit genügen, kritikwürdig und reformbedürftig, solange es ihnen nicht gelingt, allen Bürgern gerechte Anteile an den gesellschaftlich produzierten Reichtümern zu sichern."

Bei den Auseinandersetzungen um Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Steuerpolitik, Erziehungspolitik, Meinungs- und Willensfreiheit steht auch Grundsätzlicheres zur Debatte: Was verstehen wir unter "sozialer Gerechtigkeit"? In Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten werden die Grundzüge einer Theorie sozialer Gerechtigkeit entwickelt. Es handelt sich um eine egalitäre Theorie, die soziale Ungleichheit ausdrücklich zulässt, diese aber an das Vorliegen bestimmter öffentlicher Rechtfertigungsgründe bindet.

Welche Bedingungen lassen Völker gerecht und friedlich zusammenleben? Unter welchen Umständen sind Kriege gerechtfertigt? Welche Leitlinien müssen gegeben sein für Organisationen, die eine gerechte Gesellschaft von Völkern mit gleichen Rechten herzustellen vermögen?

In acht Grundsätzen für eine gerechte internationale Ordnung entwickelt der amerikanische Philosoph John Rawls einen hypothetischen "Vertrag der Gesellschaft der Völker".

Das jüngste Buch von John Rawls ist nach A Theory of Justice 1971, dt. 1975) und Political Liberalism (1993, dt. 1998) ein weiteres wichtiges Werk des bedeutenden amerikanischen Philosophen. Die Originalausgabe (The Law of Peoples, 1999) hat zu heftigen Kontroversen geführt.

This book introduces a novel challenge at the intersection of normative ethics, moral psychology and moral epistemology and develops a solution to it that has important implications for moral epistemology generally. The challenge arises from the observation that people who act in morally heroic ways often profess certainty in the rightness of their actions. Such moral conviction seems highly admirable. Yet in light of our general fallibility, it seems that moral certainty is epistemically unjustified. It thus looks as though we would have to conclude that moral heroism comes at the price of epistemic irrationality. Drawing this conclusion, however, is shown not be a viable option. The same holds for attempts at accounting for the moral hero’s conviction in alternative, entirely non-doxastic terms, or denying its admirability on the grounds that it is entangled with fanaticism. This leaves the claim that moral certainty is never epistemically justified. Via an in-depth discussion of the nature of epistemic justification for moral beliefs, this claim is shown to be false. In exceptional moral circumstances, the value of living up to one’s fundamental moral commitments encroaches upon the standards of epistemic justification.