Volume 71, Issue 1

Business history functions as a moral balance sheet, documenting humanity’s values through markets and economic pricing. This field explores the long-term evolution of the corporation, the role of the entrepreneur, and the shifting definitions of capitalism. While mid-twentieth-century scholarship prioritized large-scale organizational stability, contemporary analysis addresses a «decentralized industrial order» and the political cultures enabling enterprise. In Germany, the discipline shifted significantly in the 1990s toward critical investigations of corporate complicity and ethics during the National Socialist era. Today, as technology disrupts traditional hierarchies, business history transcends narrow organizational studies. By integrating political and cultural insights, it has effectively evolved into a universal history that reflects humanity’s broader moral and financial trajectory.

In the 21 st century, developed economies have faced an erosion of their tax base by multinationals who sell to their consumers without establishing a taxable presence, typically by gaming the treaty concept of «permanent establishment». The long-running dispute between the French government and internet giant Google is possibly the best-known example. Yet the problem of non-resident traders avoiding a taxable presence did not emerge with the advent of the digital economy, nor is it a creation of the modern tax treaty network. As this article argues, it was an issue for UK tax administrators from the inception of the British income tax in 1842, with serious attempts to counter it first being made in the 1880s. Those efforts were motivated as much by pressure from domestic business for protection from «unfair» foreign competition as by a need for revenue, and were derailed by a judicial ruling of 1896 that confirmed the right of overseas firms to structure their UK operations in a tax-efficient way. From then until the 1920s, the taxation of non-residents selling to the UK remained politically contentious. During World War I, the state hit back against foreign traders by passing a wide-reaching anti-avoidance rule, but court proceedings in 1922 rendered that law practically useless. As a result, the power of the Inland Revenue to deal with avoidance by non-residents remained extremely weak throughout the interwar period. The article asks why no further attempt was made before World War II to strengthen the Treasury’s defences. It argues that a consensus developed between business and the state that it was more important to discourage other jurisdictions from asserting taxing rights over British exporters, than for the UK to impose effective taxation of overseas firms. Despite having little to bargain with, British negotiators achieved some success in the former endeavour.

Expenditure-based taxation ( forfait fiscal/Pauschalbesteuerung ) is a distinctive Swiss tax regime under which wealthy non-working foreign residents are taxed according to their estimated living expenses and not, as ordinary taxpayers, on their income or wealth. Drawing on new sources, we analyse the emergence, expansion, and resilience of this tax regime. We show how it became embedded in cantonal tax systems despite repeated criticism from federal authorities and the international community. Expenditure-based taxation was not used to generate tax revenues but to boost high-end sedentary tourism and wealth management services. Intermediaries played a key role in the domiciliation of wealthy foreigners benefitting from such schemes. Besides offering a fresh perspective on Switzerland’s role as a tax haven for wealthy individuals, we shed light on the legal, political, and professional networks that sustain tax privileges and discuss broader issues linked to tax justice and the governance of international wealth.

This article explores the emergence of tax planning from the 20s to the 70s, focusing on the interplay between national tax policies and tax practices, corporate strategies, and international regulatory frameworks. Using well-documented examples of Thyssen and its successor companies’ tax issues, the analysis indicates how multinational firms exploited tax incentives, navigated legal grey areas, and shifted assets through holding structures to minimize tax burdens. It contributes to current research on the history of tax (avoidance) and considers the corporate level, which has been little researched to date. In view of the comparatively long period under investigation, it sheds light on the rationale behind tax avoidance – for companies and tax authorities alike. Tax avoidance was often not the primary objective but rather a by-product of decisions driven by political and economic considerations, such as securing property rights or financing international operations. It was only with the second wave of globalization in the 1970s that tax optimization increasingly became a central corporate goal. Combining micro-historical case studies with a macro-historical perspective on the development of the global tax architecture, this work illustrates how companies and states, through the dynamic of tax (dis)incentives and regulation, jointly shaped the landscape of international taxation – and of tax avoidances practices.

This article reconstructs the historical rise of the Big Four accounting firms as central actors in Luxembourg’s offshore financial centre. Moving beyond bank- and law-centric narratives, it traces how international audit networks embedded themselves in a small national market from the 1970s onward through alliances with leading local fiduciaries, integration into the expanding investment fund industry, and participation in regulatory and consultative arenas. Drawing on interviews, professional data, and institutional records, the study shows how these firms shifted from marginal service providers to key architects of tax structuring, fund governance, and financial legislation. Their dominance in fund auditing, growing role in tax and advisory work, and organizational model reshaped professional hierarchies, including the legal sector. The Luxembourg case highlights how global professional service firms act as intermediaries between states and mobile capital, making them structural components of contemporary offshore finance rather than merely technical advisers.