Volume 75, Issue 1

With an ageing population, the German pay-as-you-go long-term care insurance system is facing an increasing contribution burden. Supplementary funded financing would help to stabilise the contribution rate. In particular, a mandatory funded solution is being discussed to finance private co-payments for inpatient long-term care. The reasoning behind a mandatory insurance is that, given the prospect of tax-funded support, people could forego private provision (free-riding behaviour). However, this is countered by the fact that insured persons already must pay a deductible due to the means-tested support. In addition, empirical findings show that most pensioner households can cover private care costs from their own means, i. e. income and assets. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether a supplementary but mandatory funded scheme would ease the burden on the state. Although extended mandatory insurance would reduce the likelihood of people claiming tax-funded support, transfer payments would instead have to be made to households that would be disproportionately burdened by premium payments.

Germany’s migration policy is shaped by a basic public openness to migration, combined with strong expectations that the state regain operational control. The paper argues that over-promising in political communication – especially on deportations and “quick fixes” – has amplified distrust. Legal, administrative, and European case law set clear constraints, making such promises difficult to deliver. The strategic core is therefore a sober dual objective: reduce irregular migration as far as possible while expanding well-managed labour and education migration. A key message is that achieving these goals has no single “silver bullet.” The text cautions against miracle solutions and instead emphasizes that progress depends on the consistent, coordinated pursuit of many measures at once – legal, administrative, operational, and diplomatic – over an extended period. Domestically, the central diagnosis is not a lack of rules but weak implementation capacity: fragmented responsibilities (hundreds of local foreigners’ authorities), staff shortages, heterogeneous IT, poor inter-agency interfaces, and overloaded courts create long processing times – slowing skilled immigration and hampering returns. The paper therefore points to reforms such as consolidation and professionalization, nationwide IT standards and end-to-end digital procedures (“once-only” data), clearer federal roles for removals, and court specialization and digitalization. At EU level, it situates these efforts within the GEAS reform and discusses external partnerships, “return hubs,” and migration diplomacy as potentially useful – but legally and politically complex – tools that require reliable partners and safeguards. Finally, the paper stresses that the agenda should not focus solely on irregular migration. It highlights the importance of simplifying skilled immigration, arguing that without it Germany risks losing competitiveness in light of demographic change.

As the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum moves from legislation to implementation in 2026 and the US is polarized by harsh deportation policy, debates about “control” often conflate two distinct policy levers. I propose a simple framework based on two metaphors that can help guide thinking about policy effects. The practical openness of rules-based entry routes (“valves”) can be distinguished from the system’s sorting logic (“filters”). I argue that policy effectiveness, outcomes, and ultimately the public support for policies depend on how both interact.

This paper discusses the instrumentalization of integration measures for controlling asylum migration. This practice creates a fundamental conflict: while restrictive measures aim to deter migration, they cause long-term economic “scarring effects” and fiscal losses. Currently, political decisions often rely on intuition rather than empirical data. The author argues for an evidence-based approach that transparently weighs uncertain deterrence effects against the documented economic damage caused by hindered integration.

The article analyzes the new exceptions to the previous debt rule (Articles 109, 115 and 143h of the German Basic Law) with regard to two normative principles. From a public finance perspective, the principle of sustainability in the sense of debt sustainability is intended to ensure the long-term stability of government finances. In terms of welfare economics, intergenerational justice requires that newly issued debt does not impact negatively on the wealth of future generations. We examine the defense exception, the special fund for infrastructure and climate neutrality and the additional leeway for the federal states with regard to their justification and design based on these standards. Possible multiplier effects and inflationary effects are briefly discussed.

From 2027, the EU will supplement its existing emissions trading scheme (ETS 1) with a further trading system (EU-ETS 2) for sectors not previously covered. ETS 2 will have independent certificate prices, which presumably will be higher than ETS 1 prices. Although certificate systems are usually considered to be highly ecologically accurate and cost-efficient in economic theory, both are likely to be achieved only to a limited extent in practice due to the specific design of the ETS 2. Furthermore, some regressive distribution effects between and within the EU Member States are likely. Therefore, ETS 2 must be supported by additional measures. In the long term, one could consider to merge both ETS systems.