Volume 37, Issue 5

Using Hartmut Esser’s model of frame selection as a point of reference, this paper examines how different ways of defining a situation influence the selection of action. The introduction of the model of frame selection has substantially changed the theory of action within the macro-micro-macro-model of sociological explanation. The theory of action has become closely related to the sociology of knowledge: the theory of action as the theory of defining the situation. This paper contributes to this theoretical approach. It is argued that the criteria for selecting between the interpretive patterns which orient and guide actions depend on three different forms of defining the situation: (1) defining the situation constatively, i.e. identifying the characteristics of a given situation; and two forms of defining the situation performatively: (2) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is effectively enforceable or (3) constituting the situation by referring to a definition of the situation which is commonly shared. The assumption that the different ways of selecting between interpretive patterns depend on these three forms of defining the situation contradicts the view of the current model of frame selection, which in this respect refers to the difference between an automatic-spontaneous and a reflective-calculating mode of selection.

Field studies show that normative behavior depends on the costs of obeying the norm. This effect is known as the low-cost hypothesis. However, does the enforcement of social norms also depend on the costs of enforcing the norm? So far, there has been little research on the validity of the low-cost hypothesis for these so-called “second order collective goods.” In our work, enforcement of social norms is studied by means of analyzing social control in neighborhoods. We use data from 631 respondents in a mail survey conducted in 2001 in Leipzig, Germany. Logistic regression models reveal that the strength of the relationship between the general approval of social control and the willingness to tolerate social control personally decreases with the increasing costs of tolerating these control activities. In addition, we transfer the logic of the low-cost hypothesis to other sociological constructs: The effect of fear of crime and the effect of authoritarianism on the tolerance of social control decreases with the increasing costs of these control activities. Our empirical findings confirm the low-cost hypothesis for the production of second-order collective goods.

Based on the thesis of the overall growing inequality in German society, this paper discusses the changing inequality in earnings and wages for the period between 1998 and 2005. For the empirical analysis, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) are used. The main goal of the article is to identify the differences in the growth of the real wages of various social groups. The theoretical foundation of the article comes from economic as well as sociological concepts. Empirically the results show, first, that the inequality in real wages increased between 1998 and 2005. This increase is due to the negative growth of lower wages and a corresponding increase in median and higher wages. Secondly, a more detailed look at the wage differences with respect to a person’s individual social position reveals that people in the lower social classes, migrants, those with unemployment experiences as well as workers in lower-paying occupational classes belong to the losers in the general income changes in Germany between 1998 and 2005. The winners in the changing wage distribution are individuals in the higher social classes.

The authors contrast two political inquiries in light of Luhmann’s system theory of procedure. The article asks whether and to what extent these inquiries can be considered to be procedural systems, meaning distinct frames of action that generate specific meanings and relevancies. Starting from a micro-sociological analysis of question-answer interactions in the British “Hutton Inquiry” and the European Union’s “CIA Inquiry” the authors aim at reconstructing the specific functionalities of the respective procedures with regard to their different ways of engaging and enabling selfreferential processes of communication, knowledge production, and decision-making. Both inquiries show properties of procedural systems. But they do so to different degrees. The discourse material exhibits a gradation of self-reference, integration, and differentiation in terms of communication, knowledge production, and decision-making. As a system, each merges these three processes into a consistent, relatively strong or weak procedure. The two procedural registers are further confirmed by the participants’ discourse strategies. The participants at times invoke the respective opposite - either weak or strong - type. We conclude with further implications of our functional analysis of procedure: on the political evaluation of inquiries and their effects; on the epistemic premises of each real type; and on the strengthening and weakening dynamics in the course of the procedure. Overall, the article encourages a sociological understanding of the procedural mechanism as well as an empirical qualification and variation of system-theoretical assertions.