Volume 31, Issue 5

One of the key concepts around which German sociology was organised after 1933 was that of “community” (Gemeinschaft). This essay examines the interpretation of this concept in three currents of thought: the community theory of the “Ring”-Circle (Boehm, Krieck, etc.), the Leipzig School around Freyer and Ipsen, and “neo-collectivism”, as developed in Jena by Jerusalem and Höhn. It is shown that these interpretations not only differ from one another, but also deviate at decisive points from the definition Ferdinand Tönnies gave to the concept in his classic work. “Community” as conceived in the German sociology of this time is far more “Bund” than community in Tönnies’ sense.

This article examines the question of how to relate the understanding of sentences and of the actions performed by uttering these sentences. In considering this question the article mainly focuses on the conceptions of Jürgen Habermas and Donald Davidson. In spite of some fundamental similarities between the outlooks of both thinkers, there is a contrast in regard to their interpretation of the relationship between meaning and action. According to Habermas, communicative action is semantically self-identifying, i.e. in the case of communicative action the meaning of the sentence uttered determines the speaker’s intention and what type of action is performed. This conception dates back to Searle’s idea that meaning and action are related by constitutive rules. In the article I question the validity of Habermas’s and Searle’s analysis. Some objections to this analysis can be derived from Davidson’s criticism of convention-based theories of communication. Subsequently, Davidson’s model of communication and the role of intentions of speakers and interpreters within this model are examined. According to Davidson, no necessary relation exist between sentencemeaning, the act performed, and the speaker’s intentions. Nevertheless, interpretation rests on the hearer’s conjectures with regard to these elements. The Davidsonian approach to communication contradicts not only rule-governed approaches but also post-structuralist approaches and Luhmann’s view of communication because, according to Davidson’s model, sentences and actions can only be understood on the basis of the speaker’s intentions and the interpreter’s ability to infer these intentions.

In the corporate governance debate that has recently been revived, some commentators argue that the German insider system is moving towards the Anglo-Saxon outsider system (UK, USA) by allowing a market for corporate control to develop. One of their central arguments rests on the observation of the declining number of interlocking directorates that tie together large German corporations. In this article we contest this conclusion by carrying out a structural analysis of the German network of interlocking directorates that reveals a high degree of continuity on the meso- and macro-levels between 1989 and 2001. The slight quantitative weakening of these networks has not been translated into a process of fundamental structural erosion. This is due to the continuation of multiple interlinking that leaves financial corporations in a central position and reproduces clique as well as core-periphery structures. Together with empirical evidence from elsewhere that suggests no substantial weakening of the network of ownership ties in the future, these findings support the view that corporate control over large German corporations is still governed by a network of interlocking directorates rather than a market for corporate control.

The classical rational choice theory of voting behavior is challenged in this article by a rival approach: the pure theory of electoral preference. This theory is contrasted with the model of Anthony Downs in order to develop testable hypotheses which make it possible to discriminate empirically between these two approaches. These hypotheses deal with the evaluation of the election platforms of the different parties and their effect on the decision to go to the polls and on the decision about what party to vote for. The empirical test of these hypotheses is carried out with date from the Hamburg state elections of September 21, 1997. As a methodological innovation, the policy preferences of the voters are examined by means of conjoint analysis. The results of the empirical analyses point to the fact that the pure theory of electoral preference is better suited for an explanation of voter behavior than classical rational choice theory. In conclusion some normative implications of these findings are discussed.