Volume 4, Issue 1

First the author reports the results of westgerman and foreign empirical research on debt enforcement against individuals. Then the official and inofficial agents of debt enforcement, the creditors and the debtors in default are characterized. The debt collection process is conceived as sanctioning of norms or control of deviant behaviour. The significant feature of debt collection is its social invisibility.

In a greater empirical study on consumer credit the authors gathered data, which are analysed in this article under the aspect of debt collection. Starting from the functional necessity of consumer credit for salaried consumers the reasons of default are revealed and the conflict constellation between the skilled organization of the creditor and the debtor in his exceptional situation is described. The data are integrated into the current discussion in legal sociology on thematization, mobilization and use of law.

The existing system of debt enforcement based on the incentives of threat and cajolery does not fit the profile revealed in empirical studies. In the first section of the article the common characteristics of default debtors, creditors and of the debt enforcement process are described. The majority of default debtors are willing to pay their debts provided suitable payment terms are arranged. Payment problems are a function of certain economic and social circumstances, but not of the amorality of the debtors. In the second section the methods of mediation and conciliation are discussed. They seem to be preferable to coercion.

The present research on disputes on unfair dismissal examines the significance of some features. It is shown that the personal characteristics of the complainant-employee, the branch of the employer, and the arguments brought forward substantiating the dismissal enjoy greater weight than does the type of legal representation. An effect of judges’ attitudes could not been proven. The results of the selection within the access to the labor courts are discussed.

The legal aid movement changed the Dutch Bar during the 1970ies. It was initiated by students and young lawyers, supported by government and tolerated by the established Bar. By the 1980ies 25 % of the attorneys were living on legal aid subsidies, about 10 % can be called “specialised” on representation of social and labor law problems of the most needy. They made for a new type of ‘social advocacy’ which is here described in typological terms on basis of a multivariate analysis of an attorney survey. Recent cuts in welfare budgets raise some questions ab out the future development of legal aid in the Netherlands, but the once grown legal aid lobby is a factor for stabilizing its survival.