Volume 51, Issue 1

What are the prospects of a Christian ethics of responsibility? In the article the versions of a Christian ethics of responsibility that have been developed since the nineteen eighties in dialogue with the philosopher Hans Jonas by the four Protestant theologians William Schweiker, Wolfgang Huber, Johannes Fischer and Ulrich Körtner, are critically discussed. It is pointed out that the disparity of their views is the main reason why a responsibility ethics school within Christian ethics could not have developed up till now. An attempt is made in the article to identify common denominators for such an ethics by extracting from the views of the theologians a number of ways in which responsibility can and should today qualify Christian ethics fundamentally.

The essay discusses two different conceptions of human dignity. According to the first conception, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect something specific that is given by her being human. According to the second conception, however, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect her as a human being. With regard to the first understanding, one is bound to respect human dignity (as an abstract concept), whereas on the basis of the second conception, we owe respect to the human being herself. The duty to respect human dignity serves as a foundation for duties we have with regard to human beings as such. The duty to respect someone as the human being she is, however, is a duty towards her. This duty therefore justifies a right she may claim, namely the right to be respected as a human being. The core of human dignity, then, is this rights-conferring status of being human. This article reacts to the German debate on human embryonic research. Participants in this debate argue that human dignity depends on being human in a generic sense. According to them, the early embryo participates in this sense of being human, which allows them to apply the concept of human dignity, including the absolute protection it entails, to human embryos. The author criticizes this view, claiming that it undermines the very idea of human dignity by neglecting the rights-conferring status of being a particular human being which is at its core. Rather, a »decent society« (Avishai Margalit) is characterized by the fact that its members are treated and respected as (individual) rights-holders.

Analysing the profession of ministers (pastors, priests) in terms of sociologically and ethically funded profession ethics makes a mode of regulation and control in knowledge-based professional action - profession ethics - describable which is closely linked to trust. To adopt trust as an imperative of figuration however, it must be discussed ethically. A theoretical discourse of implementation in an institutional ethics perspective leads to alternative recommendations for figuration: Trust in the profession of ministers is no longer generated by conscious intransparancy, by smothering up mistakes and fallacies and the concealment of control of ministers but by transparancy, feeling obliged to visions, having clear aims, common identity and cooperation structures between professionals and parishioners