The article explores the roots and dynamics of political consensus on EU membership in Hungary. Employing a principal-agent theory of the political process, it emphasises the role of various forms of competition in the healthy functioning of a representative democracy. An informal discussion of the Hungarian case is followed by a game theoretical model of party collusion under circumstances when a new political dimension offers an opportunity for political representatives to weaken electoral control. A key lesson of the empirical findings as well as the formal model is that collusion among political representatives within individual nation states and collusion among states may, under specific circumstances, reinforce each other.
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedAn Unhappy Consensus: EU Membership and Party Collusion in HungaryLicensedFebruary 19, 2008
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedPublic/Private Joint Service Delivery in American Counties: Institutional Theory of Local Governance and Government CapacityLicensedFebruary 25, 2008
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedClass Is Not Dead - It Has Been Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies (1956-1990)LicensedFebruary 29, 2008
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedThe Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Retrospective of Comparative Historical Sociology of EmpiresLicensedFebruary 29, 2008