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Vorspann Der Schock des Olympia-Attentats von 1972 saß tief. Aber hatte er auch politische Konsequenzen? Eva Oberloskamp, Historikerin am Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin, geht dieser in der Forschung umstrittenen Frage äußerst umsichtig auf den Grund. Das Ergebnis ihrer aspektreichen Analyse ist klar: Das Innenministerium, das Justizministerium und das Auswärtige Amt blieben nicht untätig. Ihre Maßnahmen waren wegweisend für die internationale Kooperation auf dem Gebiet der Inneren Sicherheit. Abstract The attack on the Israeli men‘s team during the 1972 Munich Olympics caught the Federal Republic of Germany completely unprepared; improvised crisis management measures did not prevent the catastrophic outcome of the hostage taking, which resulted in 17 casualties and many wounded. In her article, Eva Oberloskamp pursues the question to what extent the shock of the Munich Massacre launched learning processes in the Federal Republic. She shows that short-term political reactions partially reverted to previous experiences and patterns of behaviour – for instance a more restrictive policy towards foreigners and the readiness to release the attackers. In the long term, however, the Munich Massacre initiated a search for new possibilities to avert terrorist threats. An important consequence was the foundation of special police units such as the GSG9 and the SEKs. Additionally the attack was an essential cause for increasing West German endeavours towards international cooperation regarding the fight against terrorism.

Vorspann Im Frühjahr 1933 überraschte Papst Pius XI. die Welt. Er lobte Hitler als den einzigen Staatsmann, der etwas gegen den Kommunismus unternehme, und gab damit der Hoffnung Ausdruck, in der neuen deutschen Regierung einen Bündnispartner gegen die „rote Gefahr“ finden zu können. Thies Schulze, Historiker an der Universität Münster, analysiert die Ursachen dieser überraschenden Wende und untersucht die Folgen der merklichen Annäherung, zu denen nicht zuletzt die Aufnahme der Verhandlungen für das Reichskonkordat zählte. Sein Beitrag wirft somit auch ein neues Licht auf die Scholder/Repgen-Debatte, die in der letzten Ausgabe der VfZ historisiert wurde. Abstract On a number of occasions in early March 1933, Pope Pius XI voiced the opinion, that Hitler was the only statesman doing something against Communism. His utterances were in no way spontaneous or thoughtless, as some of his interlocutors suspected. Rather they expressed his hope that the new government in Germany could be won as an ally against the Communist threat and the alleged accompanying moral decline. Even though the period of rapprochement towards Germany, which the Pope initiated after the Reichstag fire, only lasted for a few weeks and even though Pius XI noticeably moved away from his rather benevolent view of German politics since late April 1933, this phase was certainly important for the relationship between church and state during the Third Reich . During this time, essential decisions were made, including the commencement of negotiations about the Reich Concordat. The article examines the motives on which the papal view of Germany was based, and in particular investigates the question which domestic and foreign policy aims it was connected with. It discusses the reasons why papal policy was once again revised as of May 1933. Finally it provides a perspective on the later years of the Nazi regime and discusses whether and to what extent anti-communist motives influenced papal policy even after 1933.

Vorspann Der Holocaust war ein deutsches Projekt. Er wurde von Deutschen initiiert und vorangetrieben, aber er fand in ganz Europa erschreckend viel Sympathie, auch in Frankreich, wo sich nach dem deutschen Sieg die Vichy-Regierung klar und fast ohne deutsches Zutun für eine antisemitische Politik entschied. So lautete, knapp gefasst, die These, die Michael Mayer vor kurzem in den Vierteljahrsheften (Juli 2010) vertrat. Diese These hat nicht nur Zustimmung gefunden. War der deutsche Einfluss auf Vichy-Frankreich nicht doch viel größer, als es Mayer vermutet? Abstract Why did both the German Military Commander in France and the French Government in Vichy publish anti-Jewish decrees almost simultaneously in autumn 1940? Which influences affected both sides? Did each side act independently from one another? A review of the available sources shows, that the German military administration had not initially envisaged special treatment of the Jewish population and that its first measures did not proceed without hesitation. In the unoccupied area, French government officials were pursuing their own plans of antisemitic legislation in the summer of 1940. The announcement of German steps was more of an obstacle than an advantage to these efforts. Ultimately these different initiatives led to an acceleration of the measures against Jews throughout the whole of France.

Vorspann Dass die polnischen Juden von der deutschen Besatzungsmacht nicht nur ermordet, sondern auch in großem Maßstab ausgebeutet wurden, erfuhr die Öffentlichkeit erstmals durch ein Buch und einen Film: Schindlers Liste. Über die Geschichte dieser Zwangsarbeit und ihre Bedingungen ist indes nur wenig bekannt. Wie groß die Defizite noch immer sind, zeigte sich erst vor wenigen Jahren, bei den deutschen Prozessen über die Verrentung jüdischer Zwangsarbeiter, die den Holocaust überlebt hatten. Umso wichtiger scheint dieser Aufsatz, der auf der Basis deutscher und polnischer Quellen erstmals präzise nachzeichnet, wie diese Zwangsarbeit organisiert war und welche Konsequenzen dies für die Betroffenen hatte. Abstract The German Labour Administration in the General Government of Poland was also responsible for Jewish labour between the summer of 1940 and mid-1942. It established a system of registration, placement and remuneration of the Jews, which – after certain initial difficulties – came into universal use. The Labour Offices favoured “voluntary” employment, which specifically took advantage of the desperate situation that the ghettoised Jews found themselves in. Simultaneously forced labour was dismissed as its economic benefit seemed too minimal. For this reason, 80 to 90 percent of the working Jewish population were working voluntarily and for remuneration (in cash or foodstuffs) from the turn of the year 1940/41 to mid-1942. Wages were however neither adequate nor sufficient. Even so their manpower was preserved to a certain degree and, most importantly, their exploitation was total. The German Labour Administration proved to be a sort of agent of the Jewish labourers inherent to the system, which, while not protecting their rights, still offered preservation out of self-interest. For the National Socialist war economy, this form of exploitation of the Jews was the most efficient method. In the summer of 1942, however, the primacy of ideology over economic considerations asserted itself, as the extermination of the Polish Jews began despite their extensive and useful labour.

Vorspann Ernst von Simsons neu entdecktes Erinnerungsfragment ist keine Sensation, aber doch in dreierlei Hinsicht eine Rarität, die besondere Beachtung verdient: Hier schreibt ein hoher Beamter, der im Staatsdienst vor und nach 1918 viel erlebt hat. Hier berichtet ein kenntnisreicher Außenpolitiker, der in Versailles und Rapallo dabei war, als Weichen gestellt wurden, und hier blickt ein Mann zurück, der vom NS-Regime zum Juden gestempelt und ins Exil gedrängt wurde – trotz seiner immensen Verdienst um sein Volk, die er seinen ehrwürdigen Kollegen im „Amt“ nicht mehr vor Augen führen konnte. In den Geschichtsbüchern werden sie aber ihren Platz finden. Abstract In his recently discovered memoirs written shortly before his death in 1941, Ernst von Simson reports about his activities as head of the legal department and as State Secretary for economic issues in the German Foreign Office between 1918 and 1922. He speaks about the international tensions, which mostly resulted from the Treaty of Versailles, and his opposition to the extradition of German officers. It was his duty to sign the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles as the German representative. His memories of the conferences in Spa in 1920 and in London in 1921 illustrate the cold atmosphere of the first post-war negotiations and end in a detailed description of the economic conference in Geneva in 1922. In this context von Simson avows his personal role in the conclusion of the German-Russian Treaty of Rapallo, which he still saw as positive almost twenty years after its signing.