Volume 58, Issue 3 -

Vorspann Christoph Buchheim, der vor kurzem verstorbene bedeutende Wirtschaftshistoriker, gibt Antworten – präzise, souverän, auf der Grundlage neuer Quellen und auf der Höhe der Forschung. Seine Frage lautet: Wie gut oder wie schlecht ging es den Deutschen im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Buchheim, in den 1980er Jahren Mitarbeiter des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, bezieht sich damit auf eine aktuelle Forschungsdebatte, die nun als entschieden gelten kann. Der Lebensstandard der Deutschen, so Buchheim mit differenziertem Blick auf unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Schichten und Phasen des Krieges, war schon bei Kriegsbeginn relativ dürftig und verschlechterte sich ab 1942/43 kontinuierlich, ehe er 1945 einen Tiefpunkt erreichte. Von „Wohlleben“ könne allenfalls bei einer kleinen Oberschicht aus Staat, Partei und Wirtschaft die Rede sein, die es sich selbst in der Katastrophe noch gut gehen ließ. Abstract The article tackles with an especially explosive topic which has been widely contested for a long time and has once again been taken up intensely during the last few years. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Götz Aly in particular provoked the discussion with their pointed theses about the Good Life of the Germans during the Third Reich. Buchheim first reports on the current state of research and then presents his new sources before describing the rationing system introduced in 1939 and finally analysing the allocation of foodstuffs. He never just makes general statements: He covers the allocation of individual foodstuffs and takes individual social groups into account chronologically until 1945. The result is unambiguous: The standard of living of the Germans was already relatively frugal at the beginning of the War and continued to worsen as of 1942/43 before reaching a nadir in 1945. While keeping a differentiated view of everyday reality, the situation regarding the provisioning with consumer goods can be characterised as leaving a great deal to be desired as well - sometimes it was even more dismal than that regarding food. Only a small upper class among the party, state and economic elites enjoyed the Good Life despite the surrounding catastrophe.

Vorspann War der Holocaust ein europäisches Projekt? Keine Frage, die Initiative zum Völkermord kam aus Deutschland. Richtig ist aber auch, dass diese Initiative in ganz Europa auf ein vernehmliches Echo traf, selbst wenn es dann im Einzelnen sehr unterschiedlich ausfiel. Auch die französische Regierung, die französische Verwaltung und die französische Kirche haben sich 1940, nach dem deutschen Sieg im Westen, für eine antisemitische Politik entschieden. Das Interessante daran war, dass dies – wie jetzt nachgewiesen wird – fast ohne deutsches Zutun geschah. Abstract Due to restrictive French archival legislation, the genesis of the French racial laws of 1940 has hitherto not been subjected to a source-based study. For the first time, this article covers all relevant documents - those of the French government and administration, the German occupying power in Paris and finally the state leadership in Berlin - to comparatively investigate the complex genesis of French and German Jewish Policy in summer and autumn 1940. The focus is on the question of the extent of a German exertion of influence on French anti-Jewish policy during the first months of the Vichy Regime. The results of this analysis are subsequently cross-checked; this section covers the internal discussions of the French administration about the administrative implementation of the French race laws. Here it becomes clear that French Jewish Policy contained elements of an older Antisemitism which had developed in inter-War France and had become further radicalised after the devastating defeat in 1940. It also becomes clear that the anti-Jewish policy of the French government and the German occupying power came about relatively autonomously of each other and exhibited few points of contact until autumn 1940.

Vorspann Warum endet sie nicht, die Debatte über den militärischen Widerstand? Weil neue Dokumente und neue Thesen alte Gewissheiten in Frage gestellt haben; weil Wissenschaft stets ein dialektischer Prozess ist; und weil es sich in diesem Fall nicht gerade um ein Nebenthema der Zeitgeschichte handelt. Johannes Hürter (VfZ 52, Heft 3/Juli 2004) hat die Debatte eröffnet, wurde von Gerhard Ringshausen (VfZ 53, Heft 1/Januar 2005) kritisiert und von Felix Römer (VfZ 53, Heft 3/Juli 2005) unterstützt. Dann folgten die Beiträge von Hermann Graml (VfZ 54, Heft 1/Januar 2006) und nochmals von Johannes Hürter und Felix Römer (VfZ 54, Heft 2/April 2006). Doch gibt es in dieser Sache noch mehr Argumente? Abstract Henning von Tresckow and his military co-conspirators were in influential positions in the general staff of Army Group Centre at the beginning of the German-Soviet War. For a few years, a controversy has been raging about the question whether they were also complicit in the mass crimes committed by Himmler´s SS and police units behind the front. Against the objections of Gerhard Ringshausen and Hermann Graml, Johannes Hürter and Felix Römer assert that these officers had impassively watched the crimes of Himmler´s murder units at the beginning of the War. However, other findings presented in this article get in the way of the argumentation they have employed so far.

Deutsches Abstract In seiner Antwort weist Johannes Hürter die Argumentation und Kritik Günther Gillessens als spekulativ und wissenschaftlich verfehlt zurück. Er erinnert an den erreichten Forschungsstand über die Integration der Wehrmacht in den rassenideologischen Vernichtungskrieg und an einzelne Dokumente, die von Gillessen unvollständig zitiert und/oder verzerrend interpretiert werden. Hürter plädiert für eine kontextualisierende Analyse des Handelns von Generalstabsoffizieren an der Ostfront. Sie zeigt, in welchem Umfang Akteure wie die Offiziere des Heeresgruppenkommandos Mitte in der dramatischen Anfangsphase des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges in ein militärisch, politisch-ideologisch und ethisch radikal entgrenztes Gewaltgeschehen eingebunden waren, aus dem selbst die Hellsichtigsten und Mutigsten unter ihnen erst nach und nach einen Weg heraus in den Widerstand fanden. Abstract In his reply Johannes Hürter rebuffs the argumentation and critique employed by Günther Gillessen as speculative and academically amiss. He recounts the achieved state of research regarding the integration of the Wehrmacht into the racial/ ideological war of extermination and points to individual documents which are only quoted in excerpts and/or are interpreted in a distorted fashion by Gillessen. Hürter speaks in favour of a contextualising analysis of the actions of general staff officers at the Eastern Front. They show to what extent actors such as the officers in the Army Group Command Centre were integrated into (in military, political-ideological as well as ethical terms) radically unfettered events of violence during the dramatic initial phase of the German-Soviet War; even the most foresighted and the most courageous only emerged gradually to find their path towards resistance.

Vorspann Die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkriegs sind in der westlichen Welt eine fast schon vergessene Opfergruppe. Dabei wird die Zahl derer, die in deutschem Gewahrsam umgekommen sind, auf etwa drei Millionen Menschen geschätzt. Doch gibt es dafür nur wenige, wirklich valide Angaben. Meist völlig unbekannt ist das, was genau in den einzelnen Lagern geschah. Reinhard Otto, Rolf Keller und Jens Nagel, die mit zentralen Aktenbeständen zu diesem Thema gearbeitet haben, berechneten erstmals präzise Zahlen für die einzelnen Lager. Ihre Ergebnisse stoßen nun auf Kritik. Abstract This article is a response to a paper published in VfZ 4/2008 under the title Soviet Prisoners of War in German Custody 1941-1945. Data and Dimensions. This paper was based on project material accumulated up to 2005 by the Saxon Memorial Foundation (covering approximately 350,000 persons), with the help of which the authors calculated the total amount of Soviet prisoners of war in German hands during the Second World War. However in 2009, an examination of their method as well as their results by the project managing organisation did not result in confirmation. Rather, an examination on the basis of material relating to a figure almost twice as large (covering approximately 700,000 persons) showed that prisoners of war were registered in many more camps than the material accumulated by 2005 suggested. Additionally, a strictly schematic application of their method would lead to the conclusion that more than 11 million Soviet prisoners of war were registered by German authorities within as well as outside the territory of the Reich, not to mention prisoners of war who were not registered before their death. This is inconsistent with all that historical research has established so far, even if one presupposes a relatively large variance between the different hitherto published figures. The exact figure or order of magnitude of the Soviet prisoners of war remains unresolved.

Vorspann Die Stasi wusste, was der DDR nach dem „Machtwechsel“ in Bonn 1969 und dem Beginn einer neuen Ostpolitik drohte – und sie informierte darüber auch die SED-Führung und den „großen Bruder“ in Moskau, der sich viele unbequeme Fragen gefallen lassen musste, von Warnungen vor einer Zersetzung des Ostblocks trotzdem nichts wissen wollte. Siegfried Suckut, einer der Pioniere der westdeutschen DDR-Forschung, präsentiert die Analysen der Staatssicherheit, schildert die Konsultationen mit dem KGB und den Prozess der Anpassung, der SED und Stasi schließlich doch auf den Kurs Moskaus einschwenken ließ – zähneknirschend, wie es scheint. Abstract This article covers the question of how the political secret police of the East German Communist Party (SED) reacted to the onset of the new Eastern policy and policy on Germany of the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn in 1969/70. Material from the GDR Ministry for State Security (MfS), which has not hitherto been historiographically analysed in context, shows that minister Mielke and his deputy, the head of the department for espionage in Western countries (HVA) Markus Wolf, from the start considered this variant of imperialist policy on Germany especially dangerous for the GDR and the socialist states, as this policy ultimately aimed at abolishing socialism in the GDR and the undermining of the Eastern alliance system. They warned their friends in conversations with the KGB leadership and indirectly exhorted them not to make any concessions to the West German government at the expense of the GDR. Mielke and Andropov functioned as acting parties in consultation with their respective party leadership. The documentation is most clear regarding the planned argumentation of the GDR representatives in this proxy discourse about the Eastern policy and policy on Germany of the Brandt government; Wolf especially was resolved to exhibit a confident, sometimes even school-masterly attitude towards the Soviet representatives. This is attested by his preliminary notes for the conversation with Andropov which are presented here; according to the available documents, the meeting took place a few weeks before the signing of the treaty on the renunciation of the use of force between Bonn and Moscow in East Berlin.