Band 18, Heft 2 -

This paper uses archival material to contextualize Georg Henrik von Wright’s making of Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), an edition that assembles Wittgenstein’s remarks on cultural topics. Von Wright was particularly interested in these remarks but initially regarded them as too detached from philosophy to be published. In 1967-68, however, he began seeing socio-political questions as belonging to philosophy. He then resumed editing Wittgenstein’s ‘general remarks’ and published them in 1977. Von Wright did not read Culture and Value as a philosophical work, but as a means for helping readers understand Wittgenstein in relation to his times. It is argued that the intention to provide documents enabling readers to recognize the historical Wittgenstein motivated much of von Wright’s work as one of Wittgenstein’s literary executors. Moreover, through making available his own archives, he inspired the same documentary approach to fathom the history of editing Wittgenstein in its historical context.

Drawing on the theory of ‘mental models’, I have previously shown that the valid syllogisms in the Aristotelian logical system, including all of its figures and moods, are very easy for the human mind. Indeed, they can even be used to predict inferences that people can make with quantified sentences. In this paper, I further argue that, if mental models theory is correct, then also the Aristotelian conversion rules are not hard for the human mind. My account here again focuses on the distinction made by the mental models theory between canonical and noncanonical models.

Arguments against the Russellian theory of definite descriptions based on cases that involve failures of uniqueness are a recurrent theme in the relevant literature. In this paper, I discuss a number of such arguments, from Strawson (1950), Ramachandran (1993) and Szabo (2005). I argue that the Russellian has resources to account for these data by deploying a variety of mechanisms of quantifier domain restrictions. Finally, I present a case that is more problematic for the Russellian. While the previous cases all involve referential uses of descriptions (or some variations of such uses), the most effective objection to the uniqueness condition draws on genuine attributive uses. The research that led to this paper has been supported partially by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, EXCELENCIA programme, project no. FFI2016-80636-P. I would also like to thank Dan Zeman and Adrian Briciu for comments on a previous version of the paper.

According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s What Maisie Knew , that one thing that such a view discounts is the role of imagination in moral thought, and specifically in contributing to what Iris Murdoch has called someone’s personal vision of life.