Volume 14, Issue 2

The argument is that if we assume a non-cognitivist outlook in metaethics then we should also adopt a way of reading classics in political philosophy that focuses on moral knowledge and its link to political authority. By distinguishing between Plato and Socrates on these matters we are provided with two ideal types that may serve as useful models when clarifying past and present controversies over one of the most important questions in political philosophy: the justifiability (or non-justifiability) of majority rule. As a by-product of the discussion of Plato and Socrates a path to an interesting defence of majority rule based on non-cognitivism will become visible.

One of the main goals of this paper is to introduce the idea that a metaethical theory of the nature of normative judgment must be compatible with a plausible account of the reasons for which we act when we act on the basis of our normative judgments. Another main goal of the paper is to argue that when we try to satisfy this desideratum for a metaethical theory, we notice that cognitivism faces a challenge that non-cognitivism elegantly sidesteps. If cognitivism is true, then it is hard to explain how someone could perform an action, φ, on the basis of her judgment that she ought to φ, and thereby for the reasons that one might sensibly take to explain why she ought to φ. If we accept non-cognitivism, no similar problem arises. This, I claim, gives us a reason to prefer non-cognitivism over cognitivism. But even if someone does not find this argument against cognitivism and in favor of non-cognitivism entirely convincing, she might agree that the more general point is deserving of more attention than it has attracted in the past. I close with an attempt to deal with some possible criticisms.

In this paper, I contemplate the relationship between two apparently opposing approaches to critical theory: one privileges the focus on the rational coherence of discourse (which is characteristic, for instance, of Habermas), while the other privileges the focus upon experiential world disclosure (which is characteristic of those influenced by Heidegger). I will suggest that these two approaches complement each other in that they accentuate two different dimensions of intellectual and practical approaches towards the world: the quest for systematicity and the quest for adequacy. Habermas’ claim that critique that is not based in the protocols of rational coherence quickly becomes obscurantist and reactionary does admittedly articulate an important point in relation to critical reflection when it aims at articulating alternatives to an entrenched power structure. It will, however, be argued that critical reflection also needs an openness towards alternative narratives that are not bounded by fixed truthclaims, but rather operate through problematising the prevailing horizons of truth. This will be my starting point for suggesting that the critical aspect of world-disclosing approaches consists in their showing alternative potentialities - rather than alternative realities. In order to carry out this argument, I propose a distinction between rationality, irrationality and the non-rational, which leads to the claim that it is not irrational for rationality to be contemplated in relation to the non-rational.

The aim of the paper is to criticize the widespread view that the norm of disinterestedness is obsolete, and to defend the norm as a viable and plausible norm of scientific practice. Though the norm of disinterestedness has a longer history, it was emphasized by Merton, and subsequent discussions have focused on Merton’s discussion of it. Firstly, the paper will present an overview and critical assesment of the most important interpretations of Merton’s norm of disinterestedness that has been proposed in the literature. Secondly, the paper will rebut some of the major critscisms which has been levelled against the norm of disinterestedness, by demonstrating that these critiscisms has presupposed a variety of implausible interpretations of the norm. As such, the paper will deny that the criticisms give us reason to abandon the norm of disinterestedness in all its interpretations. To the contrary, we will argue that in the most straightforward and natural interpretation, namely by it’s connection to the concept of reliable research, the norm of disinterestedness stands unabated.

While professional philosophers are often reluctant to address the issue of the aims of philosophy, the field of philosophy with children is abundant with articulated aims which tend to be more concrete and ambitious than those of academic philosophy. Is this asymmetry a problem? And how are we to think about the aims of philosophy with children? This article argues that not much will be gained from looking to academic philosophy because discussions here are surprisingly meager and have provided little agreement. Nevertheless, it is also argued that the aims of philosophy with children must be constrained by what can be achieved by academic philosophy.

The term “nihilism” is currently resurfacing in various approaches of post- and transhumanism and in the semiotics of digital media theory. This new employment of nihilism, a term that had its heyday in the late 19 th century, is due to the fact that nihilism was always more than a catchphrase in fashionable Russian and French novels. As a critique of theology and deism, nihilism is a constituent part of the legacy of the French revolution. Today its radical questioning of the epistemological status quo and established systems make it relevant to the heirs of the intellectuals of the 1969er generation. Through Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s nihilism and through his applying it in regard to “the question concerning technology”, nihilism is now emerging in technoscience as an example of a philosophical anthropology that contextualizes the ethics behind the “new technologies”. In this framework, nihilism is shedding some of its negative connotation; it is now not only seen as an non-constructive concept, but as a positive force that allows for a better understanding of the new symbolism of digital modernity.