Abstract
The argument is that if we assume a non-cognitivist outlook in metaethics then we should also adopt a way of reading classics in political philosophy that focuses on moral knowledge and its link to political authority. By distinguishing between Plato and Socrates on these matters we are provided with two ideal types that may serve as useful models when clarifying past and present controversies over one of the most important questions in political philosophy: the justifiability (or non-justifiability) of majority rule. As a by-product of the discussion of Plato and Socrates a path to an interesting defence of majority rule based on non-cognitivism will become visible.
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Plato, Socrates, and the Politics of Meta-Aggression
- Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning
- Critique as Lending Voice to the Mystical
- The norm of disinterestedness in science; a restorative analysis
- Why Philosophy? Aims of Philosophy with Children and Aims of Academic Philosophy
- Philosophical Nihilism: A New Logic For Technological Modernity?
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Plato, Socrates, and the Politics of Meta-Aggression
- Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning
- Critique as Lending Voice to the Mystical
- The norm of disinterestedness in science; a restorative analysis
- Why Philosophy? Aims of Philosophy with Children and Aims of Academic Philosophy
- Philosophical Nihilism: A New Logic For Technological Modernity?