Volume 74, Issue 1 - Special Issue: Green Finance

We raise some critical points against a naïve interpretation of “green finance” products and strategies. These critical insights are the background against which we take a closer look at instruments and policies that might allow green finance to become more impactful. In particular, we focus on the role of a taxonomy and investor activism. We also describe the interaction of government policies with green finance practice – an aspect, which has been mostly neglected in policy debates but needs to be taken into account. Finally, the special case of green government bonds is discussed.

The transition to a sustainable economy currently involves a fundamental transformation of markets and market actors. This paper makes the case for investor empowerment as the main tool towards achieving greater sustainability in capital markets. This trust in institutional investors is grounded in various recent developments both on the supply side and the demand side of financial markets, and also in the increasing tendency of institutional investors to engage in common ownership. The need to build coalitions among different types of asset managers or institutional investors, and to convince fellow investors of any given initiative, can then act as an in-built filter helping to overcome the pursuit of idiosyncratic motives and supporting only those campaigns that are seconded by a majority of investors. In particular, institutionalized investor platforms have emerged over recent years as a force for investor empowerment, serving to coordinate investor campaigns and to share the costs of engagement. ESG engagement has the potential to become a very powerful driver towards a more sustainability-oriented future. Any regulatory activity should then be limited to a facilitative and supportive role.

We study the potential role of the ECB in supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy by decarbonizing the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP). We demonstrate that the carbon intensity of CSPP purchases is determined by three main factors: First, by the CSPP-eligibility criteria, as these tend to exclude bonds from low-emission sectors. Second, by the underlying structure of the bond market, as this tends to be skewed towards carbon-intensive sectors. Third, among the eligible bonds, the ECB tends to select those from relatively emission-intensive sectors. To decarbonize the CSPP, the ECB can theoretically act along these three lines: (i) adjust the CSPP-eligibility criteria to expand the range of eligible low-carbon assets, (ii), revise the principle of market neutrality to tilt the CSPP portfolio towards low-carbon companies, or, (iii), purchase so far neglected low-carbon bonds within the current eligibility and market neutrality framework. As all approaches have either very limited effects or are associated with significant theoretical and practical concerns, we conclude that their contribution to the success of active green monetary policy is not guaranteed, while at the same time risks arise for a monetary policy that targets price stability.