Volume 71, Issue 1 -

Motivated by recent insights from behavioral economics and social psychology, we present a theory of trade that seeks to explain inter-industry trade between countries that are similar in their production sides, but differ in their income distribution. By assuming status-dependent preferences that are non-homothetic, we show that income inequality differential can be a basis for inter-industry trade between otherwise similar economies.

We search for drivers of fiscal deficits in Europe using a data panel containing annual data of 27 EU countries in the years 1991–2012. Our special focus is on the influence of fiscal rules as well as on fiscal councils, i. e. institutions that may help to reduce deficits and enforce fiscal rules by advising governments. We distinguish between internal fiscal rules and external rules that result from EMU membership. In addition, we consider the impact of “creative accounting”, i. e. measures that help to circumvent fiscal rules, which we approximate by so called stock-flow-adjustments. We especially analyze the interactive influence of the mentioned variables on the budget balance.

Contribution payments and information are two important channels of lobbying influence. This survey analyzes what is known about these channels in Germany from a political economy perspective. Based on a discussion of the empirical literature and the available data, I argue that the state of empirical knowledge about lobbying in Germany is rather limited. To improve our understanding of the lobbying process, I identify research gaps and discuss potential methodological approaches which can be suitable to address these questions. Also, I discuss the role of party donations and temporary employment of bureaucratic staff, based on two novel data sets. The analysis indicates that party donations might play a role as a means to achieve access; in contrast, the temporary exchange of employees in the public administration seems to be of rather less importance in informational lobbying.