Volume 6, Issue 2

According to Dicaearchus, metempsychosis was the best known among Pythagoras’ teachings. In this paper, I investigate two features of Pythagorean metempsychosis: its non-retributive character and its epistemological value. I argue that the Pythagoreans did not conceive of reincarnation as a punishment for the wicked and a reward for the virtuous, but rather as a way to gain experience, knowledge and therefore wisdom. This reading enables us to throw light on the puzzling list of Pythagoras’ past lives, which includes Aethalides son of Hermes, Euphorbus the warrior, Pyrrhus the fisherman and even Alco the harlot.

In the Phaedo the character Socrates argues that suicide is morally wrong. This is in fact one of only two places in the entire Platonic corpus where suicide is discussed. It is a brief passage, and a notoriously perplexing one. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments that Socrates gives in support of his claim. I argue that one of them (what I call the Gods Argument) is not to be taken literally, while the other (what I call the Prison Argument) represents the deeper reason for the prohibition of suicide. I further relate the question of suicide to the overarching concerns of the Phaedo as a whole: the nature of our incarnate “imprisonment”, the nature and purpose of philosophy, the philosophical “purification” of the soul, the human pursuit of knowledge, and the nature of the divine.

Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo , because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus , where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul.

Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical wisdom is mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter.