Volume 3, Issue 1

This essay provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of a cluster of Heraclitus’ fragments that revolve around an image of ‘musical’ harmony (B 8, 10, and 51 Diels-Kranz). The aim is to demonstrate that more numerous as well as more specific references to contemporary musical practice can be found in these fragments than is usually thought. In particular, it is argued that in his talk of cosmic harmonia Heraclitus might well know and exploit a musical sense of this word, namely, that of ‘attunement’, which was already developing at his time from the primary meaning of ‘connection’ and ‘agreement’. Furthermore, it is shown that the investigation of musical patterns with which Heraclitus was clearly acquainted offered him a significant analogical ground for his reflectionon the order and rationality of kosmos . He was not apparently interested in the numerical definition of musical patterns, and thus there is no need to assume any influence of earlier Pythagorean research on his theory of cosmic harmony: the other way round, this theory was likely food for thought for Philolaus.

This paper (re-)examines two sources of information about Heraclitus’ fragment 22 B 52 DK, which are at the same time the sources of confusion when it comes to its interpretation: the meanings of the lexical elements that constitute the saying and the ancient testimonies that refer to it. The relevant ancient sources commonly recognise the importance of the theme of the unity of opposites in the fragment and the analysis of the fragment’s wording yields the same conclusion. It renders the saying as an original take on the popular subject of the unpredictability of human existence: the central paradox of the πεσσεία-playing child illustrates the essential uniformity behind the apparent changeability of the course of human life. Thus, the fragment may be seen as yet another expression of the universal rule of law and regularity characteristic of Heraclitus’ philosophy.

No Heraclitean fragment that bears on the political sphere compares with Fr.114 in length or theoretical ambition. Its basic preoccupation as often is with human intelligence and the need for better understanding. But its claim about the resources available to understanding is developed by means of an analogy with the city’s reliance on law and thereby on the ‘one divine’. And this is the dimension of the fragment that has most engaged scholars. It is generally supposed that a main lesson taught by the analogy is that, important resource though its law is for a city, ‘what is common’ provides understanding with a much stronger resource. This paper argues that that interpretation is misconceived: there could be no more powerful source of support than the ‘one divine’. Heraclitus’ point is rather that humans need to muster more strength to get the support available to understanding than citizens have to exercise in accessing that available in the law.

This paper is about the reception of Heraclitus’ views on the human soul in its cosmic context. Those views were updated by later thinkers, and their extensive evidence on the matter is scrutinized in detail. A World Soul and various forms of immortality came to be attributed, while soul stuff was said to be inhaled from the environment. An appendix considers the quite general opinion that Heraclitus posited some sort of afterlife for human souls. It is argued that fragments held to support this interpretation are better otherwise construed.

In a 1697 monograph, Gottfried Olearius (1672–1715) endeavours to establish Heraclitus as an important new witness for a general thesis upheld by Ralph Cudworth in 1678. According to Cudworth, Greek philosophers earlier than or independent of Leucippus combined a version of atomism with the belief that the world is ruled by God(s). Olearius tries to improve on Cudworth by showing that Heraclitus, who does not figure among Cudworth’s authorities, also upheld both atomism and theism. As to Heraclitean atomism, Olearius starts from a contra diction within the doxographical tradition: According to some authors, the first principle of Nature in Heraclitus is fire, according to others it is exhalation, i.e. air. Olearius suggests that neither “fire” nor “exhalation” can bear their ordinary meaning here, but that Heraclitus uses both terms to hint at very small, swiftly moved, indivisible particles; yet defining such particles as principles of nature must count as atomism. This result is confirmed by a metallurgical simile, apparently used by Heraclitus, which was taken by Aristotle and the doxographical tradition to imply that Heraclitus traced back everything there is to very small and indivisible fire particles prior to the One. The ascription of theism to Heraclitus, in turn, rests on two further texts which report that Heraclitus ascribed the periodical condensation and rarefaction of matter to a Fate (εἱμαρμένη) functioning as Demiurge , and that this power is to be identified with Logos and God.