Volume 2, Issue 1

Abstract: The Theaetetus is about the definition of knowledge, but also about the young Theaetetus acquiring knowledge and sophia. By defining knowledge he gives an account of his personal vocation. According to the Protagorean interpretation of his first definition, any object of knowledge is at least co-determined by the subject who grasps it. There is no proper distinction between subject and object, no right or wrong epistemic approach or perspective on any object. The digression presents Theaetetus with a comparison of this Protagorean sophia and true sophia which is the aim of the philosopher. It shows Theaetetus and the reader what a life that has either kind of sophia as its end amounts to. It also shows him that true sophia does involve a proper perspective toward its objects, that Theaetetus has to be careful which perspective he chooses, that he can improve upon his perspective, and that not everyone will approve of his choice of perspective and of the ensuing activities. The Thracian servant is an example for someone who does not approve, since she doesn’t know about perspectives. This is brought out in the anecdote, which presents the servant’s point of view. It is only the servant’s assumption that Thales fell into the well while observing stars. In fact, Thales wanted to observe zenith stars and deliberately chose a point of view, namely the bottom of a well, which allowed him to focus his field of vision on a well-defined section of the sky. Theaetetus must come to understand that the servant is missing the point of Thales’ actions. It must become clear to him that epistemic and moral success requires a careful choice of one’s perspective – and that this choice matters despite all adverse reaction he may have to face because of it.

Abstract: The paper explores Aristotle’s notion of proairesis and its theoretical background, with the aim of presenting a novel interpretation of the concept, under five headings. These are: praxis and poiēsis are different aspects of human activity (energeia) rather than different kinds of it. End and means are correlative rather than complementary components of activity. Activity as praxis is continuous: there are no distinct, elementary, indivisible actions. Desire (orexis) and deliberation (bouleusis) are not distinct and complementary components of the mental process that results in activity, but are the principles of proairesis. Since activity is identical with the individual’s entire and continuous lifespan, proairesis denotes a constant and perpetually present attitude of the human soul.

Abstract: Most of us who believe that our death will bring about the end of us as the beings that we are consider it a dire prospect. However, Epicurus believes that such an attitude lacks foundation. His most complete and detailed argument for this famous thesis that death is nothing to us we find in the Letter to Menoeceus:. Though Epicurus’ argument has been difficult to counter, the fact remains that we have problems accepting its conclusion that death is nothing to us. In this paper, I argue that, its appeal notwithstanding, this central argument by Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus, for the thesis that death is nothing to us fails to support this thesis, even assuming his own theoretical presuppositions.

Abstract: This paper examines Calcidius’ position in the notorious interpretative controversy over Plato’s dialogue Timaeus . Despite Calcidius’ far-reaching influence on the later philosophical and theological tradition, his contribution to the history of this debate has received surprisingly little attention. Against previous studies that have concluded unfavourably with regard to Calcidius’ merits as a commentator, this inquiry shows that his Platonic exegesis, far from being problematic and contradictory, is original in its approach and method. During the course of this paper, moreover, Calcidius’ affiliation with the Christian faith is reevaluated and found to be less extensive than has sometimes been assumed.