Volume 1, Issue 3

The recent debate about a new international financial architecture, i.e. a reform of the international financial system, is strongly influenced by current events. In contrast to this the paper puts the problem into the framework of Ordnungspolitik. Beginning with the development of the recent discussion and shortcomings in the international financial system, we discuss fundamental reform proposals in brief and reform steps already realized at greater length.

Banking regulation in the twenty-first century is at the crossroads. The article discusses the question whether the supervisory review of bank risk management systems is superior to the minimum capital requirements in traditional style. It points out the serious problems of both ways - especially the first one, which was preferred by the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision in its proposal ,,A new capital adequacy framework`` (June 1999).

Hedge funds are characterized by short-term investments in over- or undervalued financial instruments. Their policy is highly dynamic as opposed to the more long-term investments of mutual funds. On average, the risk taken by hedge funds appears to be higher than that taken by mutual funds, although quite risky mutual funds also exist. Banks sometimes take large default risks, as evidenced by various banking crises. Also banks trade heavily on the term structure of interest rates. Hence, in these respects it appears that banks take risks that are at least as high as hedge funds. In short-term proprietary trading, banks and hedge funds face similar challenges. Overall, hedge funds cannot be regarded as more dangerous than banks. Since hedge funds trade with professional investors and banks, there is little reason to protect these counterparties by special regulation. Moreover, most hedge funds are rather small players and do not seem to act in herds. Therefore, the probability of systemic risks created by hedge funds appears to be very low. As a consequence, market control of hedge funds supported by more transparency appears to be preferable to specific hedge fund regulation.

The turbulence in the international financial markets in the 1980s inspired the idea that independent academics might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation and thus ultimately also to the stability of the national financial sector in the United States. This led to the creation of the US “Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee“, a group of academics and other independent experts working in the field of financial regulation, which meets regularly and issues statements concerning conceptual as well as current issues in financial regulation. Two years ago, a similar shadow committee was founded in Europe. It is composed of members from 11 different countries. The special problems of financial regulation in Europe, as well as the special features of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC), derive from the fact that despite the trend towards economic and political integration, Europe is still a collection of different nations with different institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, describe the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.

The paper studies the changing relations between political systems and banking systems. After a brief survey of traditional mechanisms of protection for banks from competition combined with subsidized finance for selected worthy purposes, the paper sketches the structural change that has taken place in the financial sector and considers its implications for the workability of these mechanisms. For the future, the paper claims, the ``economic responsibility“ of banks lies in the avoidance of excessive risks burdening the community rather than in the subsidization of selected purposes.

Unregulated credit markets will not finance the majority of unemployed people when they aim to receive a loan for running their own business. In the US an optimal policy mix reduces the entry barriers so that the most promising selfemployment business plans are self-selected and financed via a secondary credit market. By this tool unemployed persons get a second chance which opens the possibility for self-employment. In Germany a similar approach is missing. The existing policy tools in the finance area are not designed to provide a second chance. 378 ß